


Wijkverbeteringsproject te Bissau

EINDVERSLAG  
(1989-1991)

Claudio Acioly JR  
Architect





cc: - HMs. Ambassade Dakar  
- Claudio  
- wijk

Aan: SNV/WA  
Van: Directeur  
SNV Guiné-Bissau  
Hans Dorresteyn



Onderwerp : Eindverslag Claudio Acioly  
Uw kenmerk :  
Datum : 09.01.91  
Ons kenmerk: 09.048.RAP

Hierbij heb ik het genoegen U een zeer lezenswaard eindverslag toe te zenden van Claudio Acioly, vertrekkend architect van het wijkverbeteringsproject. Lezenswaard vooral omdat betrokkene duidelijke standpunten inneemt over de door hem wenselijk geachte voortgang van het project, welke niet geheel overeenkomen met de lijnen uitgezet door het beleid van de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking en de aanbevelingen die de missie van de Heer Beeker geformuleerd heeft. Grofweg komt zijn betoog neer op het standpunt dat het wijkverbeteringsproject een puur habitatproject zou moeten blijven. Zijn karikaturale vergelijking met een kleermaker die een uitstekend pak maakt, waaraan de persoon die het moet gaan gebruiken zich moet aanpassen geeft duidelijk zijn bezorgdheid weer van de voorgenomen beleidsveranderingen ten aanzien van de introductie van werkgelegenheidsaspecten en vrouwenbelangen onder de projectparaplu. Vooruitgang in het verleden op deze terreinen geboekt in andere soortgelijke projecten, zijn volgens hem indirecte gevolgen van verbetering van de woonomstandigheden door een project of programma tot stand gebracht. Daarbij komt ook nog dat door de nu voorgestane ombuiging van het projectbeleid te weinig wordt ingegaan op de werkelijke problemen en behoeften die er in Bissau spelen. In de visie die Claudio vertegenwoordigt moet het project een habitatproject blijven waarin het uitvoeringselement van essentieel belang is, vanwege de problemen constructiearbeid lokaal uit te besteden en vanwege een duidelijke visibiliteit van het project door het laten zien van concrete resultaten, die voor de doelgroep aanleiding kunnen zijn om deel te nemen aan planningactiviteiten en terugbetalingsregelingen. Daarbij vindt hij - mijns inziens terecht - dat het beter is energie te besteden aan het scheppen van lokale capaciteit op het gebied van planning en beheersing van de problemen rond de verbetering van de volkswijken, dan opleiding van uitvoerders. Zeer zeker wanneer dit gezien wordt in het licht van opgedane ervaringen met uitbesteding en de seizoensgebondenheid van uitvoeringswerkzaamheden in Guiné-Bissau. In de regentijd zijn constructiewerkzaamheden ondenkbaar!



Natuurlijk staat het buiten kijf dat een project als het onderhavige oog moet hebben voor de effecten van zijn interventies op de positie van vrouwen en op de werkgelegenheid. Duidelijk moet zijn dat er geen sprake is van negatieve effecten in deze opzichten. Aan de andere kant is de materie waarmee het project zich tot nu toe heeft beziggehouden al complex genoeg. Duidelijke activiteiten op het gebied van verbetering van de positie van de vrouw of werkgelegenheidsvoorzieningen zouden onderwerp moeten zijn van een ander project of door het project uitbesteed kunnen worden.

Hoe het ook zij; het is duidelijk dat het wijkverbeteringsproject een zeer gemotiveerd en capabel medewerker verliest in de persoon van Claudio.

Met vriendelijke groet.

## PROJECT FINAL REPORT

1. PROJECT NUMBER: GW/00/029

2. PROJECT NAME: WIJKVERBETERING  
Neighbourhood Upgrading Project

3. LOCATION: BISSAU, GUINEA-BISSAU

4. COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION: MUNICIPALITY OF BISSAU

5. BUDGET: Dfl. 2,900,000.00 (DGIS)\*(1)  
PG 750,834,301.00 (RGE) \*(2)  
Dfl. 1,600,000.00 (SNV) \*(3)

6. PERIOD: Jan/1989 to Dec/1991.

7. AUTHOR: Claudio C. Acioly Jr.

8. POST: GW 12/09.02  
Architect

9. DATE: 23-12-91

\*(1) This is the budget originally allocated by the DGIS within the reconstruction fund (wereldopbouw hulp).

\*(2) This amount represents the budget allocated in local currency (Pesos Guineenses) during six years (86-91), however the amount which was in fact disbursed by the Guinean government was PG 216,825,000.00, roughly 28 %.

\*(3) This amount is an estimation of the costs of the technical assistance provided by the SNV (8 SNV'ers) during 6 years.

Neighbourhood Upgrading Project of Bissau  
Final report (1989-1991)" (1)\*  
Claudio Acioly JR.

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(1)\* This is a draft of the report, it still needs editing and  
correction works.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Evaluation is a learning process and provides feedback for the different phases of the project cycle. It is an important instrument to generate informations which can be extremely useful in the (re)design of projects and policies.

It is with this framework in mind that I formulated the present report. It is on purpose that I do not make detailed analysis of the successes of the project, rather I prefer to appoint the bottlenecks and the relevant problems which I faced during my three years of experience in Bissau because I believe that we are able to learn much more from our errors than from our successes.

This report does not follow the guidelines provided by the SNV for the formulation of what it calls the "Eindverslag" although it tackles many items referred in that framework.

It is not my intention to formulate a comprehensive report either. I would rather concentrate my attention to subjects which I consider relevant at this stage of the development of the project.

The report will not present a deep analysis on many issues related to my professional work in Bissau because it has been sufficiently illustrated in several reports presented to the project, to the SNV and to Guinean institutions.

Unfortunately, they are mostly written in Portuguese and eventually in English.

What concerns the language, I take this opportunity to apologize to SNV for using English as my working language within the institution. The reason is that I do not have a good writing speed when using the Dutch language and it is still not easy to have a clear formulation of my ideas in a short period of time demanded by this report.

The views expressed in the text were developed throughout my working experience in Bissau from January 1989 to December 1991, and it reflects my particular involvement with the diverse activities of the Project, from planning to implementation.

However, I cannot exclude the influence of my professional background and my former experiences in the fields of urban planning and low income housing gained during my working activities in Brazil and in Holland, before I joined the SNV.

Fortunately, due to my ability with the Portuguese and the Dutch languages I could have easy access to several documents about the problem of Neighbourhood Upgrading in Bissau, which were formulated before the involvement of the SNV, as well as to documents formulated by missions of the Dutch Government sent before and during the early stages of the project. I cannot deny that this reading exercise have given me a good overview about the development of the project, its strategies and its difficulties for operationalization during its years of existence.

I will also make some comments about policy issues and about the potential role that the project can play in the urban development process in Bissau. Eventually I will make a very brief analysis of some components of the project and suggest recommendations which can improve their development and performance.

I intend to mention some broad issues which are directly related to my personal insights and my relation with the SNV Bissau, some observations about the living and working conditions in Bissau, the behaviour of the SNVers in Guinea-Bissau. Therefore I do not exclude the possibility to present statements which are more based on empirical evidences rather than on scientific proved evidences.

## 2. DEFINITION OF TASKS AND RESPONSABILITIES OF THE POST

The tasks and responsibilities of the post of the architect is defined in the letter of 19/04/88, signed by the former project coordinator, Mr. H. Gijselhart, and sent to SNV/WA as an annex of the memo WILK 1007 Bis 206, 29-04-88, signed by Mr. T. van Bijsterveldt, as follow:

- "1. Verantwoordelijk voor het vormgeven en uitvoeren van het huisverbeteringsprogramma met aandacht voor:
  - \* definitie van selectiecriteria van bewoners die in aanmerking komen voor assistentie (lage inkomensgroepen).
  - \* Inventarizatie van mogelijkheden woningverbetering inclusief juridische aspecten (titel van de grond).
  - \* Overleg met bewoners over bestek, begroting, subsidie, etc...
2. Meewerken aan organisatie van een jaarlijks seminar over beleid t.a.v. wijkverbetering in Bissau.
3. Training en begeleiding van lokale medewerkers
4. Meewerken aan onderzoek/informatieverzameling ten behoeve van beleid of voorbereiding van programma.
5. Verantwoordelijk voor bouwmaterialenuitgifte en beheer hiervan".  
(Gijselhart, 1988:02)

In the document "FUNCTIE-TAAKBESCHRIJVING", filled by Mr. H. Gijselhart in March 1988, there are more relevant and complementary information about the post.

According to the document, the architect will be asked to produce information materials and handouts (folders) addressed to the inhabitants of the neighbourhoods as well as to setup a building material credit system (1.3).

It is expected that the architect will search contacts with the Ministry of Public Works (MOPCU), Residents' Committees, lay residents of the neighbourhoods, the Water and Electricity Company (EAGB), etc... (3.3).

Due to the experimental character of the project and the consequent high risks of frustrations within the activities related to the function, Mr. Gijselhart considered the working experience an essential pre-condition for the occupant of the post. He also suggested that it would be desirable to have a good preparation and orientation at the IHS-Institute for Housing and Development Studies, Rotterdam, in order to aquire a special knowledge on this field.

Therefore the conventional architecture and engineering courses have less relevance for a good performance in the post, and most important is to have a good ability in social and communication grounds (5.2 and 5.3).



### 3. SHORT DESCRIPTION ABOUT THE PERFORMANCE OF MY TASKS

As I have described in my "Eerste Ervaring Verslag", the experience of the demolition and the reconstruction of the first 6 houses in Mindará, in 1989, gave me the chance to test several important issues which could be useful in the next intervention in Cupilom de Cima.

"This fact gave the opportunity to the Project to implement some of its components: the physical planning of the neighbourhood, the technical assistance and the housing improvement programmes" (Acioly, 1988:01).

Because the existing job description was not sufficiently clear to provide the elements that could guide me during my start in the project, it became important for me to define the meaning of housing improvement and technical assistance. So that I could formulate a sound intervention and integrate it with the various activities of the project.

At that moment, I defined the housing improvement programme as an activity which requires the technical assistance provided by the professionals of the project during the building process, and implies a financial support through the provision building materials.

The active participation of the resident in the improvement of his house and his financial commitment to a cost recovery scheme is the pre-condition to finance the aquisition of building materials and receive the technical assistance of the project.

The technical assistance programme consists of a full technical support to the residents which is realized through project design, construction guidance, on site supervision and orientation in the construction process, topographic plotation, assistance in the improvement of the sanitation system, supply of information, legal support on land tenure issues, etc...

Physical planning means in fact a physical intervention in the urban structure of the neighbourhood. By relocating houses and creating better access to inner spaces of the neighbourhoods, it is possible to achieve certain urban patterns and create conditions for a future legalization of the areas. This means the possibility to incorporate these neighbourhoods in the official urban network of Bissau while a better living environment is created at the same time. Thus the realization of the physical plan of a settlement would necessarily imply the demolition and reconstruction of houses, and its reconstruction could only take place with an intensive participation of the house owner and his family.

The physical planning component was missing in my job description and it did not exist in the whole project structure either. However, I could not see a neighbourhood upgrading project without this component because I was, and I am still, convinced that neighbourhood upgrading cannot succeed in Bissau and elsewhere if it does not consider the ultimate articulation between housing, urban planning and community participation.

So, in fact I have incorporated a new activity in my list of responsibilities towards the project during these last 3 years. Physical planning implied a good field survey and a lot of field

research on the environmental conditions of the neighbourhoods, the living and physical conditions of the houses, the social practices involved in the use of the private and public spaces and a good overview on town planning of the city.

The plan of operations formulated for Cupilom de Cima (Volume I, 1989), and the final project report (Volume II, 1991) reflected strongly the integration of this important component in the whole conceptual framework of the project.

Not only that, but it also responded to the preoccupations expressed by the Guinean authorities in different moments of the history of the project and as well as to the recommendations made by the evaluation reports formulated by C. Dijkgraaf (1986) and K. Nimpuno (1990).

The accomplishment of the other tasks was a natural consequence of the overall planning process: field research and socio-economic surveys; guidance to counterpart architects and animators of the project; presentations of the plans to the residents, to their community organizations and to the governmental institutions; the development of communication tools in order to make the project goals better understood by the inhabitants; articulation with the different departments of the Municipality of Bissau, including the mayor; articulation with the MOFCU, the establishment of a direct channel with the team responsible for the formulation of the Bissau master plan, working meetings, including a personal presentation of the final plan of Cupilom de Cima to the Minister; and a contribution to the Guinean government for the formulation of a habitat policy in Bissau through the formulation of papers, technical responses, policy papers... For more detailed information about these activities, see the last chapter of this report.

The policy oriented approach implicit in the performance of the occupant of this post is an important element in the project structure. The definition of the strategies of the project and its approach is an essential procedure to start any intervention in a particular neighbourhood. It implies a clarification of a working method and the formulation of different instruments to achieve the goals established: better living conditions in the neighbourhoods.

The method, the strategies and the instruments will form the core of a neighbourhood upgrading policy, and that has been achieved with my performance in this post of the project.

Although several key issues were not discussed in depth during the successful seminar organized by the project, the discussions revealed the acceptance of the present approach put forward in Cupilom de Cima and demonstrated the prospects of a neighbourhood upgrading policy as an efficient strategy to improve the habitat conditions in the popular neighbourhoods of Bissau.

The interest devoted by the recently launched Guinean Television Station (TVE-GE) for this issue reinforces the importance of the project for the formulation of a sustainable urban policy in Bissau. The urban problem of the city was constantly present in the broadcast program of the TVE-GE, and the project was focussed for four times, and twice during a full 1 hour program.

In Cupilom de Cima, a whole project cycle has been completed: from survey, to planning and implementation, and from now on, the consolidation of the settlement will take place having the project intervention as a point of reference.

Recently, the MOFCU has issued a document signed by Minister A. Lima Gomes with very positive remarks about the contents of the second volume of the Cupilom report. Referring to that, the mayor of Bissau has formulated a concept document which tackles the approval of the report and the recommendations enclosed, as well as the building and urban regulations. The municipal decree appoints three technicians who will be encharged of all matters related to the settlement and will search a cooperation with the PMBB and with the Ministry of Finance in order to implement an urban tax programme.

On one hand, the follow up phases in that neighbourhood will depend on how the Municipality will proceed with the tax collection system, the legalization of land tenure, the demarcation of the plots. But on the other hand, it will depend on how the new project team will assist the Municipality in the execution of these new tasks.

The monitoring and the implementation of impact evaluations will be fully in the hands of the coming project team.

Related to this, I would like to mention one issue which I was not able to address myself during my staying in the project: the legal aspects of urban land subdivision.

Although I had brought some documents from Brazil over this subject, the working load did not allow me to concentrate energy on that. The lack of a legal adviser in the Municipality and in the MOFCU with experience in urban land legal aspects made the accomplishment of this task very difficult. The next project team must pay attention to that issue because the lack of definition about the traditional land occupation is one the bottlenecks for the future legalization of the neighbourhoods and it is in fact the pre-condition for a successful implementation of a tax policy over urban land occupation in the neighbourhoods.

This is one the objectives of the project in Cupilom de Cima which could only be achieved when the implementation of the works could be completed. At this moment this goal remains unaccomplished.

Referring to my daily tasks and the demands of the project, it was sometimes very difficult to separate the technician from the social worker, the engineer from the planner, the communication expert from the building supervisor. I was obliged to play many different roles and had to assume so many different responsibilities which caused negative effects during my performance of my real tasks listed in the official job description.

Nevertheless, the involvement of the residents brings a strong social component to the work and obliges a flexible attitude by the technician. Besides, the project operates under very special circumstances with a small professional staff and that obliges a multidisciplinary approach by everyone of its members.

With a good and efficient coordination, it is possible to fill the eventual gaps but that was not always possible.

Anyhow, the project has accumulated sufficient experience, its working force is now able to carry on a variety of activities in a systematic way but still needs a great deal of guidance from the expatriated team. The lessons learned from the successes and failures of the project should be considered in the future, and it will certainly affect the definition of the tasks of the next project team members.



#### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS TO A JOB DESCRIPTION FOR THIS POST IN RELATION TO THE SECOND PHASE OF THE PROJECT (1992-1996)

In several opportunities I was able to emphasize the close linkage that exists between the evolution of the project and the role played by the architect/planner. In the documents "Voortzettingadvies Functie Architect" (Acioly, 1991) and "The Neighbourhood Upgrading Project of Bissau: a second phase proposal" (Acioly and Gijsselhart, 1991) this is sufficiently explained.

The concept of neighbourhood upgrading highlights the issues of settlement planning and housing improvement. These issues belong to the areas of competence of this professional.

It is important to mention that the evolution of the project and the incorporation of housing and urban planning in the framework of the project is credited to the positive support given by the former project coordinator, Mr. H. Gijsselhart.

Although Mr. Gijsselhart did not have a technical background, his exposure to the problems faced by the cities of the developing countries and his familiarity with the dilemmas of housing the poor, acquired during his long experience at the IHS-Institute for Housing and Development Studies, gave him the means to look at the development of the project with a very broad view. He was quite aware about the dynamics and the potentials of the project within the context of Guinea-Bissau.

I was particularly grateful with our useful and substantial discussions about the turnkey points of urban development in Bissau.

As project coordinator, if he would have had any doubt about the right track of the project, it would have continued as a mere "infrastructure improvement project".

I also do not see myself achieving a good performance in the project without my previous professional experience in Brasilia and my academic exercises in the IHS and the Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning of the TU Delft.

Therefore, I consider the working experience extremely relevant for the occupation of this post.

The urban development of Bissau is demanding the input of very qualified professionals, and some are already available locally. And with the way the project is developing towards the future, its likely that this post will become the most important position in the project structure.

My question is: will the SNV be able to recruit a good experienced professional offering the present contractual conditions ? Will the post be sufficiently attractive to call the attention of suitable candidates ? Can the SNV speed up with the recruiting and think about an alternative employment condition ?

Concerning the profile of the professional, it is essential that he or she has had a minimum of 2 years experience in low income housing and slum upgrading projects in developing countries, and must be familiar with community participation and self-help housing processes, urban planning, concepts, methods. In this sense, he must be able to coach local architects in the development and formulation of plans and

policies.

At the present team structure, there is no professional which could function as a social worker and as an animator. Therefore, the architect will certainly fulfill part of this gap which implies a certain extra load to his tasks.

For the second phase (92-96), there is a prospect to have a communication expert in the project team, but it is not possible to foresee how long the recruiting will take. The communication expert will relieve the load from the architect in terms of communication to the population, and give him time to concentrate on more technical matters.

It will be extremely important that the architect has an excellent knowledge of Portuguese, and with the ability to express himself both orally and through written reports. He must be able to express his ideas and plans verbally and graphically speaking and have a good sense of creativity, specially when it needs explanations to the residents and people who are not familiar with urban and architectural problems.

He must have a team oriented working method, and function in full cooperation with the engineer and the communication expert.

It would be desirable if the project could count on a very qualified engineer in the team, perhaps a TUDelf engineer, who could share with the architect certain tasks related to building technologies for housing constructions, physical planning, settlement plotation and policy issues, because both the water supply system, the drainage gutters and the latrines do not have so much complexity.

It would be desirable if the SNV could form a team of very qualified professionals for the coming phase, with different profiles than the "technical" experts graduated from the High Technical Schools.

In terms of job description, I could suggest the following:

- 1 To formulate and to develop the settlement plans of the neighbourhoods. That includes the urban designs, land use plan, and urban regulations, and detailed proposals.
- 2 To articulate the planning procedures of the Project with the planning activities carried out by other departments of the Municipality of Bissau (CMB) and the Ministry of Public Works (MOPCU).
- 3 To develop tools for project presentations to the governmental agencies involved, to the residents and community organizations, and give occasional inputs to the animation program.
- 4 To formulate policy proposals and develop different strategies to tackle the housing problem in the neighbourhoods, strategies which will be linked with the implementation of the overall physical plan.
5. To formulate some guidelines in terms of land occupation regulations, urban taxation, and articulate the legalization strategy of the project with the procedures of the Municipality of Bissau.

6. To formulate occasional policy papers and proposals related to neighbourhood improvement which will be presented to the CMB and to the MOFCU.
7. To formulate and to coordinate "plan oriented researches" in the neighbourhoods.
8. To supervise some eventual building activities relevant for the implementation of the settlement plan
9. To assist and provide "on job training" to counterpart architects posted in the project.
10. To assist the formulation and implementation of training workshops addressed to planners, architects, engineers from MOFCU and CMB which will be eventually sponsored by the project.
11. To assist the project coordinator in the preparation, formulation and implementation of a seminar.

## 5. THE OPERATION OF THE PROJECT DURING THE PLANNING PHASE

All the preparation works, data collection, formulation of the plans and designs, reports, etc... had to take place in a very precise period of time because the implementation phase was always restricted by the heavy rain season.

In the beginning I could not count on almost any assistance from counterparts, except for the first interviews of the residents in Mindará.

For the formulation of the plan of Cupilom, the project could count on more local manpower. Mr. Vicente Tito, an architect of the Municipality was responsible for the elaboration of a 1:250 maquette of the southern part of the settlement.

For the household interviews, the project could count already with the participation of Mr. Sidi Jaquité who was just becoming the official animator of the project.

Mr. Jaquité started with me in the small scale housing project in Mindará as a brick layer, in February of 1989. He was a former primary school teacher with an amazing potential and a great capacity to learn. I only discover that he did not have experience in the building sector after the works were successfully done.

Through a lot of training and assistance given by Mrs. M. Kasper, who was hired to start the program for the organization of the water taps in Belém, he could perceive the goals and the methods to reach the population.

On planning activities I could give him a great deal of assistance and "on job training" and develop the field research, household interviews, etc...

He became our efficient channel of communication with the residents, although he demanded my presence at almost every meeting in order to explain the technical matters and arguments. During the second phase of Cupilom he was able to prepare the meetings with the residents and train his new assistant, Mr. Ansumane Sanhá, in the presentations of slide series and transparencies which explained the goals of the project, its duties and the responsibilities of the inhabitants. Except for the first meeting, all the other 7 meetings were coordinated by him and Mr. Sanhá.

Mr. Tito, who came back in the end of 1989 from a 5 month course sponsored by the project in the IHS, in Holland, joined our planning activities and formulated the preliminary urban layout proposal for Mindará, and later on carried out the inventory of the houses in Cupilom de Cima, together with Mr. Jaquité.

Mr. Tito proved to be an efficient doer but lacks the indispensable substance for planning and design works. He has very limited abilities to formulate a project report, is very oldfashioned while formulating an urban design, and is very little aware of the cost implications with a particular urban layout. However, he knows all the channels and tricks inside the Municipality and has the access to most of the processes of the inhabitants of the neighbourhoods. He knows it better than any other professional staff of the Municipality. He is loyal to the project, has always demonstrated an honest behaviour, nevertheless he demands a lot of guidance. This coincides with the remarks given to me by his tutor in the IHS, Mr. F. Kooyman.



What concerns "guidance", the same can be applied to Mr. Jaquité. After the establishment of his small enterprise JOSI (supported by the project), his attention to his duties at the project has visibly decreased, and that has caused a negative effect in some project's activities and has demanded at the same time an extra attention by me, the project coordinator and by the administrator and financial officer of the project.

In 1991, Miss Edna Medina, who had graduated from a technical school in Cuba, joined the project and was immediately engaged with the designs and detail plans of the houses in Cupilom.

She assisted me in the measurements of the open spaces created with the demolition of the houses which had to be done in order to elaborate a precise 1:500 location plan of each house to be rebuilt. This precise plans were indispensable for the construction sector.

My difficulty was that there was too much time spent in doing these field measurements and in fact it should have been a task of the field engineers. To do the field checks and to elaborate the designs was time consuming and delayed the start of some houses. Some of the 26 houses of Cupilom had a very difficult location and demanded a constant feed back in order to have the precise location of the plots and consequently the correct location of the foundations of the houses.

I tried to dellegate Mr. Tito and Miss Medina to do the job while I would proceed with the elaboration of the designs, giving all the guidelines in sketches, but the result was not always precise.

During this period, it became obvious the existing lack of articulation between the planning and execution sectors of the project, and it highlighted the importance of having a good cadastral procedure and an accurate topographic survey of the settlement before the intervention would start.

It became clear as well that my counterparts were not sufficiently keen and had not understood the need for so much accuracy.

The location plans of the 5 houses reconstructed by the project in Mindará, under the responsibility of Mr. Tito, revealed the lack of accuracy in the location plans which was reflected in the location of the foundations and consequently in the construction of the houses in relation to the existing houses in the site.

Later on, I involved Miss Medina in the inventory of Reino-Gambeafada, and she demonstrated the lack of initiative to implement the field work and in some occasions it became apparent her desinterest to the project works.

An efficient counterpart architect is possible to be found in Bissau and they have showed desire to join the project but they were not sufficiently motivated with the existing employment conditions of the project. They know that their involvement in the project activities will demand a full time job with a lot of responsibilities and that will make it difficult to combine with their extra job activities.

This is an issue that SNV should seriously consider for the next phase of the project.

Most of the architects of the MOPCU or CME are constantly busy with their private affairs and survival strategies in order to achieve a minimum living standard, with an obvious negative effect on their

performance within these institutions.

Their earnings as public employees are at least ridiculous: between 150.000,00 FG and 250.000,00, or less than US\$ 50.00 at the parallel market rate.

As a consequence, they are constantly searching for second sources of income, and that is found in the private sector: design of houses to individual clients, taxis and transportations, private project offices, commercial activities, etc...

It may be case that they lack some experience in the field of low income housing and neighbourhood upgrading projects. Many of these professionals are graduated from faculties of architecture and urban planning in Portugal and Iugoslavia, some with master degrees, but traditionally the curriculum of these schools do not pay attention to expontaneous urbanization in the developing countries and the urban and housing policies related to it.

Therefore the project has a great responsability to spread the potential, the feasibility and the existing methods and approaches to tackle the problem of neighbourhood upgrading in Bissau. On the one hand, the accumulated experience provides an universe of possibilities for that and on the other, the project can offer to these professionals, including our direct counterparts, the opportunities for training. That means to sponsor the organization of special workshops in Bissau, to sponsor working visits to projects in the neighbouring countries (Senegal's Dalifor project in Dakar, Bamako's upgrading programs, Ouagadugo) or search for grants from NUFFIC to support their training in Holland at specialized courses (IHS, ISS, ITC, TUDelft).

Very recently, I had the chance to meet an architect, Mr. Augusto Regala, who graduated in Brazil in 1985, and has a master degree in engineering. He has lived in Brazil for 11 years where he gained professional experience with low income housing projects and with general architectural and urbanistic projects. I presume he could be a suitable candidate to occupy this post.

After analyzing his Curriculum Vitae and discussed some issues about the approach of the project, I have introduced him to the project coordinator, Mr. G. Derkzen.

The bottleneck will be the employment conditions and the salary the project will be able to offer him. I would suggest the SNV Bissau to solve this problem by offering him a salary complementation.

I think that the SNV should take every opportunity to try out the occupation of some posts by local technicians and reinforce a certain autonomous process within the projects it finances.

This may be the case for an experimentation.

## 6. THE OPERATION OF THE PROJECT DURING THE PHASE OF IMPLEMENTATION

During the early stages of the implementation of the plan of Cupilom de Cina, it became obvious that the project structure and the articulation between the team members was not sufficient to face the implementation of a variety of activities which had to overlap each other in time and in process.

Aliu Mané, a guinean building engineer (HTS, Germany) had been operating alone in Belém for quite some time before the arrival of the present expatriated team, under the supervision of Mr. Gijsselhart.

I could witness that indeed he was technically capable to coordinate the working force and execute the drainage and water supply system in a sound way, although the quality control was not always desirable.

Belém was the largest neighbourhood of the three, and received the biggest intervention of the project in terms of infrastructure.

In Cupilom, the smallest neighbourhood, both Mr. Aliu Mané and Mr. Bart Peters could work together in the implementation of the works.

The scale of the work was smaller than in Belém and although the project could count now on two building supervisors in the field, several problems arose. Mr. Mané became a shadow of Mr. Peters instead of assuming part of Mr. Peters' responsibilities, something which was easy to be arranged because a good plan of operation had been formulated with a clear implementation strategy and with defined chronological steps of activities: demolition of the first 9 houses, excavation of the drainage gutters, preparation of the plots, reconstruction of roads, etc...

Much time was consumed in meetings and discussions within the team in order to define the tasks and responsibilities during implementation. That implied a request to my constant participation in the supervision of the building of the houses as well.

My personnel evaluation is that there was a lack of an effective coordination which could define the tasks and responsibilities per component or per area of activity.

Later on, during some meetings I heard critics about the increase of the working load caused by the housing component which demanded a lot of "on site" supervision and was causing a negative impact in the other components. But in fact, the project had much less work in the infrastructure sector, it had two professionals in the construction site, and the support of a third one, but it was unable to operate smoothly. Furthermore, the constant presence of the planner in execution works affected negatively the process of planning and preparation of other important works related to the continuation of the project.

This process revealed a clear management problem. There were a lot of difficulties to delegate tasks, and a lack of definition derived by the lack of a collective understanding about the structure of the project and the nature of a comprehensive plan.


The consequence was that there was a lack of cohesion among each of the project's components and that has been highlighted by the evaluation report of Mr. K. Nimpuno (1990).

The project needs to define a clear internal institutional structure in

order to function without these conflicts but being aware for the risks of becoming bureaucratic. This project cannot afford to have an unflexible structure. That will demand a very efficient coordination role by the project coordinator.

Another aspect which is worth to mention here is the way the expatriated team members related to one another during the operation of the project.

Among the SNVers there is no hierarchical relation and I could say that they belong to a horizontal structure. However, as the project develops throughout its different stages, from planning to implementation, a clear hierarchical framework is realized (see below). The formulation of the settlement plan and the definition of locations, roads, pipes, gutters, plots, etc... imposed a point of departure for implementation which was formerly approved by the residents and by the Municipality, and was agreed by the project team in the periodical technical meetings.



Mr. Gijsselhart's coordination style was very open to group discussion and team decision, but there were too many 'ad hoc' decisions taken in the field without consultation to the planner, to the project coordinator, even to the administrator when it concerned financial arrangements.

It is unacceptable that a public water standpost had to be demolished because of its unsuitable location. Or that a whole excavation for the water pipe network had to be redone because it crossed the private areas of the plots, latrines built in very odd locations which impeded future extensions of the houses, houses build in different locations than what the plan had specified, and so many other improvised solutions which could only take place because there was no understanding about each other's tasks and responsibilities, and because the project could not count on a full and critical participation of the Guinean counterparts, including the co-director.



Inspection procedures are always important in order to put things on the right track, and in this sense the project has been operating extremely independent. That has its advantages and disadvantages.

The advantage is that the project is able to operate without the common delays that occurs when certain inspection structure exists in this country, and the implementation timetable does not depend on any formal approval. The project has learned some lessons from its period under the tutorship of the MOPCU.

However, this complete independency neither has any positive impact in terms of the institutionalization of the project within the CMB's structure nor calls for any commitment from the local authorities and technicians.

The disadvantage is that there is no form of backstopping or formal critics from which the project could learn and reformulate any part of its work.

I would like to mention once more that the implementation of a neighbourhood upgrading project with all its implicit components demand a very professional attitude by its members, something that was missing in different occasions during these last 3 years.

Another aspect of implementation which is worth to comment is the experience of creating two small scale private enterprises within the project structure: the enterprise of former project building supervisor, Mr. Aliu Mané, and the JOSI enterprise of Mr. Sidi Jaquité and Mr. Jorge U. Sacó, bookkeeper of the project.

The former was created primarily to implement different drainage works in the city which was financed by the World Bank, and was a response of the project to a request made by the Bank's Infrastructure Relief Program-PASI. The latter was created with the intention to collect all rent payments of the housing program and the debts of the latrine program, and eventually it would do some finishing works in the rooms before renting: plastering, floors, doors, windows, paintings, etc...

Technically speaking, the Aliu Mané enterprise can be consider as a successful experience. The project strongly supported the establishment of a building contractor in the urban scenario of Bissau. The brigade experience of the project added to the experience accumulated by Mr. Mané during his activities in the project reached a positive result and was appreciated by PASI.

However, it brought negative impacts in the implementation and administration structure of the project. A sudden division of means and machines, raw material, supervision, manpower, technical assistance, bookkeeping imposed to the project a duplication of several activities and an extra demand on its staff, specially the building supervisor, the administrator, and in a lesser extent the engineer.

The implementation of such a work demanded a constant control and supervision which was not possible to be provided by the project during its implementation phase. The dilemma was to judge the project's priorities and to appoint what was its primary goal: the support to private enterprises or the support to its "on going" contractual responsibilities.

Mr. Aliu Mané was operating very independently and gaining more and

more "status" in the project structure, having the solely subordination to the project coordinator.

The financial mismanipulation of the profit gained with the enterprise done by Mr. Mané, which was thought to be used in a housing revolving fund, should be seen as a pure consequence of the way the enterprise was placed within the project structure and the way it was operationalized.

There are many implications when a different entity is created within the structure of the project.

At first, there is a natural deviation of the project from its main goals and creates one or even more components in its loaded program.

Secondly, the attention of the labour force is immediately distracted by the possibility of creating their own private enterprise and perhaps getting the opportunity to earn an income which the project, in principle, is not able to offer. As a consequence, job opportunities out of the project control becomes extremely attractive to the newly created enterprises.

Thirdly, it is obvious that the establishment of an enterprise parallel to the project will demand a series of inputs from the expatriated team and consequently demand assistance, financial control, building quality control, on site inspection, and so on.

At last, the project support gives a false impression that the enterprises can stand on their feet alone but in fact, without capital and equipments they are unable to be consolidated independently. Unless it can be given as a gift, and even so I have my doubts at this stage of development of both the labour force of the project and the building sector in Bissau as a whole.

The experience with the JOSI enterprise confirmed the above points. The goal of the enterprise was changed in practice by its two members, inclusive with an official "operation permit" (alvará) issued by the MOPCU. It became a real building contractor operating parallel to the project and neglected its original tasks and responsibilities. Just to illustrate, the residents of the 6 houses of Mindará had been coming to the project to pay their monthly fees on time during one straight year and when JOSI took over the fee collection, the payments stoppoda and was delayed for more than 4-5 months.

The rents were not collected, the bookkeeping was not updated, the animation and field works were not efficient as it used to be, the personnel affairs of the project were neglected, the financial interests of JOSI were above the project's interests.

The last arrangements of the books, rent collection, and the bookkeeping of JOSI must be credited to the full time engagement of the administrator and financial office of the project, Mrs. J. Gomes Lopes.

In my point of view, the tasks and obligations of the Neighbourhood Upgrading project of Bissau does not match this direct involvement with the development of small scale private enterprises.

It is a suitable instrument for the development of a job creation policy. It is also a mechanism to create self-sustaining processes in the building sector, but it is far from being a component of the project, considering its goals and objectives, its present structure, its professional staff and its manpower capacity.

## 7. COMMENTS ABOUT PAST EVALUATION MISSIONS

There were some evaluation missions which took place in 1986 and 1990, lead by Mr. C. Dijkgraaf (IHS) and K. Nimpuno (ERC/TU Delft) respectively.

Mr. Dijkgraaf suggested that the project should give more attention to town planning and that there was an urgent need to tackle the issues of management of the benefits implemented in the neighbourhoods and community participation.

That has been subject of a memo formulated in the same year by Mrs. Filomena Viegas, director of Housing and Urbanism of the Ministry of Public Works (DGHU/MOPCU) as well. She criticized the limited participation of the residents and announced the existence of an urban plan for Cupilom de Cima.

Urban planning has been a constant issue of discussion in the historical development of the project, since the early stages.

In his report, Mr. Nimpuno has also suggested that the project should pay great attention to town planning and search for a good channel of communication with the master plan team. He could picture the position of the project in a broad policy framework without neglecting the analysis of the different project components. However, some turnkey points were missing in his report: there was nothing addressed to the great problem of the project which is its institutional linkage with the Municipality and the position of the Guinean project co-director. Unfortunately, he did not pay attention neither to the financial situation of the project and its cost recovery instruments, nor to the experience of the micro-scale enterprise established by the Project and its former building supervisor Aliu Mané.

Although he had many fixed opinions about neighbourhood upgrading, Mr. Nimpuno could carry out valuable and very intensive discussions with the team members. Before his departure, he presented a concept report which was subject of a very positive discussion with the project team.

More recently, the mission C. Beeker (VU/Amsterdam) took place with the objective to formulate the guidelines for the second phase of the project and achieve an agreement with the Guinean authorities, having as a reference the second phase proposal (Acioly and Gijssels, 1991), the IDmemo from the Dutch embassy in Dakar (Cuperus, 1991) and some orientation from DGIS and SNV.

Mr. Beeker arrived with a camera ready report in his mind and was in fact not very concerned with the views of the project team members about the future development of the project. It became obvious that he had in mind the implementation of the Ouagadougou model, which was already presented in the seminar organized by the project in 1990. That land demarcation strategy with its financial and legal implications which was implemented in Burkina Faso is unsuitable for the context of the popular neighbourhoods in Bissau.

It became clear that the project had to suffer a radical shift. And in fact that represented the start of a new project because his idea that it would be possible to realize the same procedures in the outskirt neighbourhoods meant that the project should shift from the central located neighbourhoods to the outskirts, or at least to combine

them. These were not target areas of the project as agreed with the CMB and MOFCU.

The whole preparation work, the discussions carried out with the local authorities to define the areas of intervention, the memos and the reports produced, the surveys and the blowups of the airphoto, were all done for nothing. He ignored the whole efforts made by Mr. Gijssels and me in order to articulate the project with the MOFCU and find an institutional position of the project during the execution of the master plan.

What was really in question was the concept of the project. His personal ideas and the new recipe for development cooperation (A wereld van verschil) was imposing the immediately reformulation of the concept and the definition of the project. No matter what the cost of that will be.

I was astonished with the fact that I was completely excluded from the discussions Mr. Beeker carried out with the SNV and with the present project coordinator, Mr. G. Derksen. I was the only team member with an accumulated experience in the project at that moment and with sufficient information to be provided to the discussions, and all that was completely neglected.

Both Mr. Derksen and Mr. Dorresteyn were just taking over their posts in Bissau and were certainly not completely informed about the backgrounds.

At last but not least, Mr. Beeker appeared in the project with a resolution suggested by the SNV Bissau, placing the project in a new institutional framework attached to a recently organized NGO called ALTERNAG.

I consider it as an irresponsible attitude or at least a not well thought decision from the part of SNV Bissau.

Besides the fact that this new institutional arrangement was never subject of discussions with the MOFC and the CMB, and not even with the project team, it ignored completely the "on going" discussions with the CMB and MOFCU about the "Council of Urbanization". The nature of this NGO was completely unknown as well.

The former SNV director had his sympathy for the group who organized ALTERNAG, specially for the former Minister of Education, Manuel Rambout, but the group had no tradition and no former experience with an urban development project or an urban community project, such as ours. Besides, the NGO was launched within the scope of the 1992 United Nations Assembly for the Environment which will take place in Rio de Janeiro, and its members are known to be part of the "List of 121" (internal political opposition of the PAIGC).

The discussion about this proposition would certainly bring a lot of confusion, it was totally unsuitable for the Guinean context and would cause a lot of suspicion from the Municipality about the real intentions of SNV, as it did, and the proposal was totally rejected by the mayor of Bissau. And in the following meeting with the MOFCU, it was no longer a point of discussion.

In one week time, Mr. Beeker was able to picture the nature of the project and its future. His report presents some proposals which does



not consider the natural evolution and development of the project. The expatriated team is radically reduced to 2, and there is now an emphasis to train brigades and transform them into small building contractors, so that the project can become a good practical technical school having the expatriated engineer as their teacher and assistant (?). Women became a special target group of the project, not that they have never been, but perhaps it would be interesting to stimulate their emancipation and their participation in the job market through neighbourhood upgrading at the cost of the desintegration of their weak household structure. The improvement of the markets of the city will become a component of the project maybe to respond to the "speerpunt" of employment generation and create a self-sustaining process of the target population through commercial activities (?). Once more the ALTERNAG is thought to be a good partner for the project which reinforces the idea that whenever there is an institutional problem, the "NGO syndrome" spreads without frontiers.

Despite my above critics, the report brings the possibility of the establishment of an independent Municipal Agency for Planning and Neighbourhood Upgrading, and correctly suggests the implementation of a feasibility study of this agency to define the tasks, areas of intervention, responsibilities, its relation with the OMB, etc... It is likely that Mr. Beeker's exposure to the case of the ARU-Agence de Rehabilitation Urbaine, in Tunisia, influenced his opinion on this matter. This is a good start to search for the institutionalization of the project within the institutional framework of the Municipality. This study should take place along the period and should not be considered as a pre-condition to start moving in this direction. However, the position and character of the co-director still remains unsolved and Mr. Beeker made no step in this direction. The real institutionalization of the project, or this agency, has to pass through the definition of this post. In 1989, in my "Eerste ervaring veslag", I emphasized this point and until now it has not been solved.

In fact, I am tackling some issues related to the future of the project which is the theme of the next chapter. However, I would like to make some final comments about Mr. Beeker's report.

He argues about the cost per inhabitant implicit in the first english second phase proposal. He took into account the wrong figures about the population of the 3 selected neighbourhoods. In fact, our recent survey has proved what was stated in the report (Acioly and Gijsselhart, 1991:25) that a 10 % margin of error should be considered. The population of Reino-Gambeafada is not 5,469 but 7,000 inhabitants, which will increase the total target population of the project up to about 20,000 inhabitants. The argument that the cost per inhabitant is very high should be relativated, because it includes the preparation of a resettlement site which will be used by the project (Agency) throughout the future interventions. Anyhow, the cost is decrease to Dfl 190.00 (US\$ 95.00) per inhabitant, which is exactly half of the GNP per capita of Guinea Bissau.

To include the cost of the expatriated team in the cost calculations of

the project, as he suggested, implies that the concept of international cooperation of the Dutch government and of the SNV needs to be reformulated as well.

Indeed, cost recovery must be a point of departure in order to create the financial conditions to spread and consolidate a sustainable neighbourhood upgrading policy, but to use it as an argument against the present approach of the project seems to be an incorrect attitude. Specially because it ignores completely all the steps made in order to recover the investments made in the housing sector which is intended to create a revolving fund.

And also because it neglects the fact that the project has a processual development. It can only develop step by step and under the conditions imposed by the socio-economic and political context of the country. A rate of return of the investments became a real preoccupation during the final stages of the implementation in Belém and it was thought that in Cupilom de Cima, a cost recovery scheme could be possibly implemented. It is defined as one of its final goal in the settlement.

The achieved involvement of the residents in the neighbourhood provides a suitable ground to experiment a series of post implementation activities and to setup of a cost recovery programme.

The resident committee already declared to the project that they are willing to create improvement taxes in Cupilom and that they would like to take over several management and maintenance tasks from the Municipality in order to guarantee the total control of the improvements and the re-investment in their own neighbourhood.

## 8. VIEWS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PROJECT

In August (26-8-91), the whole top staff of the Municipality met to discuss the future of the project and issued a two page document in which the main ideas of the CMB were formulated.

The first point emphasized that there is no need to shift the present policy and activities of the project rather to integrate the participation and the responsibilities of the CMB into the process. They agreed that the project should develop in the direction of an independent public enterprise attached to the institutional structure of the CMB. They wish to have more involvement of the different departments of the CMB with the activities of the project and four of its technicians posted in the process of neighbourhood upgrading.

They wish to establish areas of cooperation e.g. field research, planning activities and plan formulation, development of human resources, short and long term training... and to stimulate the implementation of a cost recovery scheme through urban land taxation, collection of water supply and trash collection fees.

There is an understanding that the financial resources derived from the cost recovery programmes should (re)finance neighbourhood upgrading activities and the rehabilitation of the equipments. They would like to keep the solid waste collection in the neighbourhoods still in the hands of the project, simply because the Municipality has been unable to guarantee the service at city level despite the support of the French cooperation and the recently PASI sponsored private-public partnership enterprise.

The Municipality does not accept the existence of small scale enterprises operating as a satellite structure of the project and suggests to create a commission formed by the SNV, CMB, PMBB, MOPCU, SEP (State Secretariat of Planning), MCI (Ministry of International Cooperation) to discuss the formulation of a term of agreement which will become the basis of the new contract between the CMB and the SNV.

During the discussions with the Municipality and through my personal contacts with the different members of the staff of the CMB, including the mayor, Mr. Manuel Saturnino, I come to the conclusion that for the first time the needs and the demands of the project receive the attention it deserves by the institution (Mr. Saturnino) and by some of its professionals e.g. Mário Miranda (secretary for external affairs and finance and close adviser of the mayor), architect Alfredo da Silva, Mário Lopes (chief Administrator and land affairs officer), Manoel Antonio (chief of the Department of Topography), and in lesser extent Sérgio Mané (Director of Urbanism).

There is a visible change in behavior. This is a consequence of Mr. Saturnino's management efforts in order to integrate the actions of the project with the activities of the CMB, and vice-versa. He personally assumed the responsibilities to solve a variety of problems which involved the counterpart financial contribution, the payment of the debts of the residents, small problems in Cupilom de Cima, and he has delegated some of his staff members to accompany the project in the resolution of some of these problems.

In his appearance in the Television, during his visits to the neighbourhoods and during some meetings, Mr. Saturnino has expressed his preoccupations with the cost recovery mechanisms and wants the CMB

to play a more decisive role in the neighbourhoods where the project has made its intervention.

The recent formulated municipal decret (concept), which approved the Cupilom report, volume II, confirms these preoccupations. The CMB has accepted all the recommendations included in the report and appointed three technicians to accompany the consolidation of the neighbourhood in close cooperation with the project. They will search as well for an assistance from the Ministry of Economy and Finance in order to define the criterias and the values of the tariffs for land use in the neighbourhood.

In my opinion, one of the prerequisites for the implementation of a pilot cost recovery programme in Cupilom de Cima has been fulfilled. The next project team will have the task to bring it forward in a very favourable position because both the MOFCU and the CMB have reacted very positively about the work implemented in Cupilom de Cima and they wish to demonstrate the feasibility of neighbourhood upgrading.

Referring to the second phase of the project, Mr. Saturnino has issued an internal decret which gives to the project the ultimate decision about the building licenses, legalization and demarcation of plots, and authorization of new housing extensions in the neighbourhoods of Mindará, Cupilom de Baixo and Reino-Gambeafada. So that the project will have the total control about the requests of the inhabitants of these locations and will be able to consider all these variables during the formulation of the settlement plan.

As it was briefly explained in the former chapter, the Beeker mission brought other ingredients into the discussion but it seems to have had very little impact to change the position of the Guineans (CMB, MOFCU). Except for the CMB who started to think about the possibility to rehabilitate its construction and repair department by involving it with the implementation works of the project. That would imply a change in the institutional structure of the Municipality and a selection procedure to define the best elements to join the working force. But I think this is not a feasible "move" considering the stagnated situation of that department e.g. lack of motivation, low salaries, advanced age group, long periods without activities. Besides, the project can still count on the essential experience accumulated by its loyal working force.

The Municipality wishes to use the ability of the project to reach the resident as its instrument of tax collection. It started to look at the animation sector of the new agency as an opportunity to articulate itself with the lay residents and use this channel of communication to stimulate the payments of the urban land taxation, to inform about cost recovery policies. That is a feasible action if it is concerned with the target neighbourhoods.

Another idea that arose from the discussion is the possibility of the project (Agency) to carry out field surveys (land ownership, building and quantity surveys) and topographic measurements in order to ellaborate a final city cadastral map which will give the data basis to start with a tax collection programme. There is a will to build a data bank, informatized if possible, which will provide better opportunities for urban management.

Knowing the working load of the project and considering the time and energy consumed by this activity, it is not desirable that the project team will concentrate attention on this issue at city level. It would be advisable to restrict it to the target neighbourhoods and elaborate a complete file about each neighbourhood, as it was done in Cupilom de Cima (except for the accurate topographic measurements). That would give the most relevant elements to formulate a plan, execute it and to implement a tax collection programme as a follow up phase. This activity, if carried out by the project, should be oriented to plan making and implementation.

The views of the Municipality are frequently based on a "profit" oriented approach. In other words, to take the opportunity to include the institution's needs in the new agreement and gain a little help to solve its most urgent problems: lack of capacity to generate income, lack of control of the city's built environment, lack of mean to carry out the trash collection system, estagnated machinery, etc.. Although there is a visible change in behavior with Mr. Saturnino, the Municipality's position has been often very passive.

There is no doubt that the future of the project, as a neighbourhood upgrading unit, is closely linked with the institutional reform of the Municipality and the replacement of some elements who have been occupying some key positions for many years e.g. director of Urbanism, director of the Implementation Department, land and administration officer, financial officer and bookkeeper.

During Mr. Becker's mission, the World Bank's Infrastructure Rehabilitation Programme-PRI sponsored a mission to analyze the present fiscal policies of the Municipality, its bookkeeping and institutional framework among other secondary issues, and formulate guidelines in order to achieve a more efficient institutional framework and promote the financial autonomy of the Municipality.

The mission detected what was already a common sense: the lack of a clear and smooth institutional structure and the lack of defined competences and responsibilities; the procedures and functionality of the institution dates from the colonial period and it is in total state of stagnation; there is a lack of management at all levels; there is a process of deterioration of the human, financial and organizational mean; the salaries are extremely low; the collection of tax is not at all implemented; all papers, documents and memorandi have to cross long internal circuits before they receive approval, and there is a complete lack of equipments and an inadequate physical space.

The present method and approach of neighbourhood upgrading received a positive remark in the mission's analysis about the project, and it is recommended to duplicate and institutionalize the experience as well as to create a sustainable financial basis through the legalization and taxation of the plots.

The final report suggests a series of measures, the most important one is the implementation of a "Municipal Plan of Operation" through which a variety of actions will take place in order to guarantee financial resources and officialize the proposed structure of the CMB with its three different directorates and three independent municipal enterprises: the water and electricity company, the solid waste

collection company and the Urbanization and Construction company. The latter represents the new version of the project.

The mission stayed for about 45 days in Bissau and throughout this period I could carry out discussions with the three technicians about their ideas and analysis of the CMB. They did not wish to separate the planning from implementation because the experience showed that this separation frequently causes several negative impacts e.g. increase of costs, demand for constant control and supervision for quality and quantity control, uncontrolled delays...

The mission's proposition contradicts the ideas for the future of the the present project coordinator, Mr. G. Derkzen, who wants to privatize the implementation sector of the project and create "on job" training programmes to the brigades and turn them independent small scale enterprises. He puts a great emphasis on planning activities and wishes to have the formulation of comprehensive plans by the new agency and the development of more research activities at city level. That includes the policy instruments of the Dutch government for urban poverty reduction e.g. environment, employment and income generation, women, and research and technology.

He wishes to have the agency well structured in four different departments and with a clear institutional framework, and keep it as independent as possible from the Municipality with very well defined areas of intervention and competence.

According to Mr. Derkzen, the cadastral system will fall under the responsibility of the agency and through this action it will be possible to legalize the plots and implement a land taxation policy in all the 9 neighbourhoods through which the financial resources will be mobilized to (re)finance neighbourhood upgrading activities.

In operational terms, the implementation working load of the project is drastically diminished. According to Mr. Derkzen, the new policy of the project will be "to do less" (minder te maken) per neighbourhood: the plans will be formulated on a comprehensive basis but only partially executed until the inhabitants have fulfilled some financial requirements as it was done in Ouagadogo. The residents will be asked to pay in advance a certain amount which will guarantee the continuation of the improvement activities in their living areas. If this is not succeeded then the project will move out to other areas.

As a consequence, the participation of the expatriated communication expert will be very decisive in order to create the instruments which will guarantee the acceptance of such a model and will sensitize the inhabitants about the correctness of this proposal. It is expected that the communication sector of the agency will grow in importance in the agency structure as Mr. Derkzen wishes to intensify the articulation with the inhabitants of the neighbourhoods.

Normally, the improvement in the provision of basic infrastructure e.g. water supply, drainage, roads, pavement, public electricity, etc.. causes the increase of the living costs in a particular area of the city and it is normally reflected in the costs of the urban commodities, land and building taxations. The direct and indirect impacts of improvement are only felt after implementation takes place. It is only afterwards that the residents are requested to commit themselves in financial terms. For the next phase of the project, it



is proposed the inverse.

It is likely that this change will bring a lot of problems and delays. Personally I have great doubts about this "advanced payment" strategy. It is impossible to predict the future but I am almost sure that this is bound for failing. The accomplishment of financial commitments is a great problem in Guinea-Bissau and this is mentioned in all foreign mission reports which deal with financial instruments, fiscal policies, etc... I would prefer the project to try out the tax collection in a small pilot basis, in Cupilom for example, before moving into this delicate area in a new neighbourhood because it can disturb a lot of our relation with the inhabitants if it is not clear what the project, or agency, wants in their neighbourhood, how come the sudden change in the working method ?

I can expect a whole lot of time spent on discussions with the residents in order to agree upon the strategy, and if it is accepted, more time consumed to agree about the amount to be payed by every household, or every house unit. And because the timetable for implementation is clearly restrained by the rain season, it might be the case of having an expatriated team occupied with plan formulation, research activities and articulation with the residents without having any follow up actions.

The project built up a reputation of an authentic doer. It has a peculiar punch and tempo. It has gained the respect from the lay resident up to the high authorities of this country due to its incredible capacity to realize interventions in the city. It would be a drawback if this characteristic of the project would disappear. Besides, what is going to happen with the working force of the project in the short term period ? Is the support to establish private enterprises through a training programme addressed to the brigades a feasible solution and an alternative for the project (agency) ? This should be sufficiently discussed within the team and with the various partner of the project in the urban development process mainly the CMB and MOPCU.

Neither this new approach nor the new document formulated by Mr. Derkzen (Uitvoeringsdocument 1992-1995, October, 1991) has been sufficiently discussed with the present expatriated team and with the Municipality of Bissau.

And until now the project is operating without any formal agreement with the CMB since the contract between the CMB and the SNV ended in may of this year, almost 7 months ago.

This lack of definition is not good for the self-esteem of the workers of the project and does not provide a firm and clear guideline to our counterparts for the short and long term period.

Mr. Derkzen's personal ideas about the project and its future complemented by the "new" guidelines for the Dutch funded projects implies that the project should shift towards other directions, and that bring us once more to the basic issue: the concept of the project.

At last but not least "urban poverty reduction" has been included as one of the components of the development cooperation policy of the Netherlands. This shift should be credited to the arrival of Mr. J.

Pronk in the government, who was coincidentally responsible for the radical shift that took place in 1974: self sustaining processes of development and the self-reliance of the target groups. A guideline that has influenced the operation of the SNV throughout these years.

And particularly, the project has not done more than to stimulate self sustainable processes of development within the neighbourhoods and that should be subject of a very critical evaluation before all those radical shifts are implemented.

The ideas formulated and included in the text "A world of difference, a new framework for development cooperation in the 1990s" (DVL/OS, The Hague, April 1991) shows that the policy is an excellent piece of work but when it is put in practice it should be relativated with the local context of each country and the peculiarities of the projects concerned. It should not be a unilateral attitude.

How these policy goals can be materialized and which projects are more suitable to carry out such tasks is the turnkey point!

I do not see these points transformed into goals and/or components of the project.

The present trends and changings which the project should go through reveals a very caricatural situation: a dressmaker designed and sewed a very nice suit which "must" fit into the client's anatomy even if the client is obliged to go through an incredible diet, even shrink if necessary, or do everything to gain weight and hight so that the suit will fit nicely. That is how I see the present changes which are undertaken by one of the parties involved in the project.

The experience with the Aliu Mané and JOSI enterprises provided sufficient elements against the idea to incorporate the development of small scale enterprises within the project structure.

And the implementation phase of PASI faced a great difficulty with the small building contractors who often failed to meet the basic requirements e.g. timetable, the quantity of works executed not meeting the advanced payment provided, lack of professionalism..., which gives more doubts about the feasibility of relying the implementation of the project on local contractors, considering the strict timetable of the project as well.

Besides that, all the efforts to incorporate the inhabitants in the working process failed despite the offers and opportunities given: payment through building material, through housing improvement, through cash payments based on productivity rates.

It would be a better option that the project, or agency, would keep a selective group of workers and maintain an implementation unit which will guarantee the tempo and the quality of the works, and the control of its costs, and will optimize the experience which was accumulated throughout the years. Eventually, it will be useful to tender some tasks to local building contractors and decentralize some of the activities. However, I think that the implications of giving away all the implementation works will leave a gap in the structure of the project. Exactly in its strongest and most consolidated component.

If it is an obligation to incorporate the elements of the employment generation policy in the overall strategies of the project, let it be done by a supplementary small scale project sponsored by the SNV within the process of neighbourhood upgrading but out of the responsibilities

of the project team.

Experiences undertaken in other developing countries reveal that employment and income generation is an indirect impact of neighbourhood upgrading and habitat projects, and concerning the project interventions in Bissau, this has not been assessed yet.

Job creation and income generation programmes are usually instruments and strategies of a broad urban development policy of a city, and is closely linked with sites & services and slum upgrading programmes.

In the case of Bissau, this does not exist yet but recently the government has made the first steps to define it for 1992.

I think that the project should look very carefully at the impacts of its actions in terms of income and employment generation however it is not suitable to transform it as one of its component. There are more suitable projects for that: BOPLIB, OMETAL, COOPACs... This same view is shared by Mr. Gijsselhart, former project coordinator, in his final project report (Eindverslag, werkverbetering Juli 1987-Juli 1991. October/1991).

The training program addressed to the brigades will demand a lot of involvement from the expatriated team if it is done in the correct way and in my view, it should not be part of the project structure. It would be advisable to concentrate on "on job" training and/or formation courses addressed to counterpart technicians involved in the whole process of planning and designing: urban planning, policy formulation, architecture, urban design, infrastructure design and calculations, topographic and cadastral techniques, bookkeeping strategies, budgeting. There is a more urgent need in that sphere.

Another target group could be the community leaders. The experience with the neighbourhood council of Cupilom de Cima revealed the potential of this organization but it also showed the weakness and the lack knowledge about the basic principles of urban management and settlement planning. If the project could pay attention to this particular group it could test the possibility to decentralize certain activities from the project and the Municipality and materialize an autonomous process of urban management.

Women is an indirect target group of the project. Through the organization of the water taps and through the campaigns for solid waste collection, the women were a dominant group. In Cupilom, 50 women were contacted by the animation sector of the project in order to organize a collective washing place. They manifested their will to pay a fee and organize a small club to guarantee the operation and management of the washing place. Perhaps it is an insufficient effort because it is not a part of a broad gender approach.

When I attended the first meeting of the SNVers posted in Bissau, in 1989, we discussed the possibility of the Women group (Vrouwen vakgroep) to carry out a pilot research in the improved neighbourhoods in order to assess the impacts of the project's interventions, what real improvements were achieved by the women, what was their participation in the water supply management process, and so many other questions which the project would like to have an answer in order to direct its interventions. But until now, the group was neither able to formulate any idea about it nor to present a sound proposal to the

project on that issue.

Although I think there is a lot of "delirium" with this gender approach, it is indeed important to find out what are the impacts of neighbourhood upgrading on certain categories of the inhabitants, not only the women but also the children, unemployed inhabitants, those involved in the informal sector... The other step will be: what to do with the recommendations and the conclusions of the studies?

However there are more suitable partners which can do the job and carry out the research, in the same way Harrie Mengers developed his study about Cupilom de Cima as a post graduate student from the Catholic University of Nijmegen. His study provided a very relevant set of information to start our intervention in the neighbourhood but was carried out independently from the project structure. The SNV can stimulate this kind of activity concerning some of the policy's "speerpunten".

The whole experience in Cupilom de Cima demonstrated the feasibility of neighbourhood upgrading and revealed the bottlenecks in the planning and implementation phases. Cupilom was a test case. It was a show case as well. The whole intervention could have finished after the demolition of the 11 houses which were situated in the axis of the planned roads. However, we opted to test the technical and financial feasibility of an assisted self-help housing program by offering the possibility for housing renewal to the inhabitants whose houses were located in contradiction with the settlement plan, all on a voluntary basis. This has been subject of a preliminary evaluation report which I formulated for the seminar organized by the MOPCU and the World Bank ("Reflexões Acerca das Limitações e Potenciais da Auto-construção em Bissau com base nas experiências acumuladas do Projeto Melhoramento dos Bairros de Bissau", Acioly, C., Oct/1991).

The experience of the project in the low income housing sector has provided a series of elements for the development of a low income housing policy which will certainly be part of a broad urban development policy for Bissau.

This is one of the potentials of the project which should be reinforced in the future. Its policy character.

In three years, the project could realize the equivalent to almost 1/3 of the housing stock which was produced by the housing programs sponsored by the government in the last 18 years. The lack of a sustainable and continuous housing policy has caused a negative effect in the whole urban development of Bissau e.g. increase of illegal building practices, overoccupation of houses, increase of renting and subletting of rooms, uncontrolled rental prices and speculation, decay of the housing stock, deteriorated environmental conditions, unsuitable sanitary conditions, development of an informal land market out of government control, etc... The economically weaker groups were the principal victims of this situation, specially those living in the target neighbourhoods.

The project has demonstrated the potentials of a low income self-help housing program and identified the financial and practical constraints. The emphasis was in the optimization of local building materials and the popular technology.

From Mindará to Cupilom de Cima, the houses became slightly bigger and

higher in standard; the participation of the project in the project cycle of the house increased and consequently there was an increase in its costs and a decrease in the amount which is possible to be recovered by the project.

In the former, the cost of the house was US\$ 1,900.00 with a subsidy of 26 % and in the latter US\$ 3,500.00 with an implicit subsidy of 56 % (Acioly, 1991:27) excluding the costs of transportation, equipments.

The project faces a dilemma in the housing sector. It must diminish the cost of the house and that can be achieved through the decrease of its participation in the project cycle. Or to diminish the size of the house and that means the implementation of "modern" core house and evolutionary concepts of housing development which will demand a lot of effort to inform and to convince the inhabitants about its suitability (at this moment with very little chance to succeed).

Another alternative is to lower the standard of some components e.g. corrugated sheets or even to exclude them from the project e.g. doors and windows, and floors.

The other alternative is to demand a higher amount as a down payment requirement to be met by the resident, or to combine all these possibilities with a longer period of amortization. Anyhow, it is a decision that has to be well thought about it.

My suggestion is that the concrete foundation and the corrugated sheet should never be taken out of the housing package and that the cost recovery mechanism should really receive a great attention, specially now that the Guinean government is preparing the establishment of a Habitat Bank (within the scope of the recently launched discussion about the National Housing Policy).

The project has implemented a very creative cost recovery mechanism through renting out rooms of the reconstructed houses which offers opportunities for housing in the "informal" rental market, actually the only way available for the economically weaker groups.

There is no doubt that the cost per house should go through a critical analytical procedure, but the problems faced by the project is due to the incapacity of the JOSI enterprise to perform its tasks and to the lack of control by the project on the implementation of the cost recovery programme.

Mr. Gijselhart offers a good cost-benefit analysis on the housing types implemented by the project (Gijselhart, "Financiele Aspecten van het Wijkverbeteringsproject, periode 1985-1991". Nov/1991). Eventual conflicts with the financial figures that are presented in his study is due to the consideration (or not) of the costs of certain components in the calculation of the price per house.

Due to several critics received by the housing component e.g. unefficient and unsufficient cost recovery, extra working load, delays caused by conflicts with house owners, demand for intensive "on site" supervision, etc... there is a tendency to give it less importance in the next phases of the project.

I would consider it as a retrocession.

The housing situation in the neighbourhoods has been always a subject of analysis of most of the reports produced within the scope of the project, and as well as by the reports of the missions sponsored by the World Bank, United Nations, USAID, etc... and the only real practical

experience of low income housing that exists in this country is provided by the 50 houses rebuilt by the project with intensive participation of the house owner.

When one look at the priorities for neighbourhood improvement, the residents of Cupilom de Cima put it as their highest priority. The same is applied by the residents of Reino-Gambeafada who put it together with the water supply as their top priorities.

Of course that the list of priorities appointed by the residents in a survey must be analyzed and interpreted with criterias. In Reino-Gambeafada, for example, where there is only one public standpost for 7,000 inhabitants, water supply scores the highest marks, followed by housing and health centre and drainage comes as their last priority in the list. However, considering the environmental conditions in the neighbourhood and the fast and critical process of erosion, it is not possible to imagine an intervention in that area without solving the problem of drainage. And it is not possible to think about neighbourhood improvement in that area without tackling the issue of housing improvement due to its deteriorated housing stock and its chaotic urban morphology.

That brings us to the issue: what is the concept of the project ?

The project is a habitat project oriented to neighbourhood upgrading and community participation. Therefore it should concentrate itself at the neighbourhood level delivering some of the urban basic commodities: water, sanitation, drainage, accesses, housing, land. It is not a broad community development project and therefore it does not involve the delivery of community services e.g. health centres, parks, playgrounds, schools, working centres, etc... however, it must look after these issues by searching for partners, special funds and credit facilities which can be put available to complement neighbourhood upgrading.

As an urban habitat project, it reflects the concepts of slum and squatter upgrading policies already explicit in the international specialized literature about this theme, and therefore it has a progressive development approach and must tackle the issues of settlement planning, housing, land tenure, land use, land rights, urban taxation and cost recovery.

Urban planning, housing and income are closely linked in a neighbourhood upgrading programme so that the project should carefully assess its direct and indirect impacts on the target population.

The target group of the project is well defined as the economically weaker groups of the guinean society and should be involved in the whole project cycle, from planning to implementation.

The direct involvement of the inhabitant should be looked at as an opportunity to generate autonomous processes of urban management and to stimulate the establishment of community organizations out of government control.

As an urban project, it should be well articulated with the urban development and housing policies formulated for the city and provide the informations (feedback) gathered from the experience aquired at neighbourhood level (field). The project has indeed a policy character and should be placed as one of the instruments of the urban development policy of Bissau.



The sites & services Antula Bono project, which was originally funded only by the World Bank provides the opportunity for this policy and practical articulation. The budget allocation for the project has gained the financial support of the UNDP-United Nations Development Fund and the FENU-United Nations Fund for Equipments and raised its budget to almost 5 Million US Dollars which increased the number of its components.

The practical articulation will be the most significant part of the work in the next phase. A prerequisite to start the new interventions in Reino-Gambeafada and Mindará will be the availability of a re-settlement area to where the families, whose houses cannot be rebuilt in their original neighbourhood, will be displaced. The new plots can be easily provided by the Antula Bono project through financial and institutional arrangements with the project (agency). Mr. Gjsselhart and myself have started the discussion about this area with the MOPCU and the CMB. More recently, I had the opportunity to make an analysis of the most important components of the Antula project and formulated a report (parecer) in which I reinforced once more the need to have this articulation. The Antula project and the overall actions concerned with its various components will provide many openings for the integration of neighbourhood upgrading which must be taken firmly by the new project team.

The establishment or the replacement of the project by the new Agency for Neighbourhood Upgrading and Urban Renovation (ANUR ?) will take place at a moment where many changes are occurring at the institutional framework related to urban affairs. And that provides a favourable scenario for the institutionalization of neighbourhood upgrading at policy level.

If we look back at the background history of the project it is possible to look with a prospective view about the components which will form the core of the neighbourhood upgrading project in the second phase.

The first period is characterized as the experimental phase of the project.

The emphasis was put in the implementation works and the delivery of the basic urban commodities in the neighbourhoods of Mindará (86-87) and Belém (88-89). The organization of the working brigades and the establishment of an implementation method received the highest priority. In Belém, as the working force was gaining sufficient experience, attention was devoted to community participation and post implementation management and maintenance.

The second period is characterized by the development of a neighbourhood upgrading strategy and its acceptance by the local parties involved.

In Cupilom de Cina (90-91), the project implemented a comprehensive settlement plan which combined the provision of basic infrastructure, housing, urban planning and community participation.

The implementation scheme and the working force was sufficiently coherent so that the emphasis was given to participatory models in the planning process, housing improvement, land subdivision, and cost recovery.

The third period (92-94) will certainly be characterized by the institutionalization of neighbourhood upgrading at policy level, the development of settlement plans and the legalization of land tenure in the improved neighbourhoods. The emphasis will be given to juridical aspects, land taxation, cost recovery mechanisms and community involvement, although the plans for the target neighbourhoods will be formulated applying the methodology used in Cupilom de Cima. There will be a need to search for special funds to create an autonomous process of plan formation under guinean responsibility, in other words, funds to pay a worthy salary to the local qualified technicians.

During the forth period (94-96) the input of the SNV will focus on the ultimate institutionalization and consolidation of the agency.

The way I see the development of the project, there will be no need to create innovative formulas for implementation although there will be chances to experiment some occasional implementation tasks.

One of the bottlenecks will be the organization of the neighbourhood upgrading fund which is the pre-condition to have the follow up phases without the financial input from the Netherlands.

It is hard to foresee the development of the project in the next five years, specially because it will take place within the whole process of democratization of the country.

But considering the institutional difficulties, the scarcity of financial resources, the unsuitable salary policy for the public employees, the uncertainty of the urban development policy for Bissau, it is likely that the Netherlands will not be able to withdraw in 1996 leaving a stablished and consolidated structure behind.

Since the idea is to consolidate an autonomous and self sustainable process of neighbourhood upgrading, I would suggest for the next phase (1992-1996) that the SNV or DGIS would create possibilities to have a temporary input at the urban management level, posted at the Municipality of Bissau and in direct connection with the process of the institutionalization of neighbourhood upgrading and the consolidation of the agency.

The period between 1996 and 1998 should be considered as the period of withdrawal and the ultimate consolidation of neighbourhood upgrading under guinean responsibility.

At last, the transition from the first to the second phase revealed a series of delays and misapprehension by people not directly involved which caused the complete paralization of the project and the dismissal of its complete working force, and impeded a smooth development towards the future.

After so many years of intensive works, difficulties, successes and failures, appraisal missions, it was very frustrating to see the collapse of a very good Dutch funded project.

A project that exposed publicly the success of the Dutch cooperation in Guinea-Bissau.

Considering the dimensions of the urban problem of Bissau and the budget allocated to the neighbourhood upgrading project and its direct and indirect impact on the target groups, it could be easily considered as the best Dutch funded project in this country.

## 10. PERSONAL INSIGHTS

From 1989 to 1991, the living conditions in Bissau improved significantly, specially concerning the supply of basic goods although it was not always affordable to the local inhabitants.

Life can be considered as difficult for an expatriated technician coming from a more developed country.

The difficulties may increase to those who cannot speak the local languages e.g. portuguese and creolo and to those who are not so familiar with the peculiarities of such a poor developing country.

In principle, the people is very friendly and peaceful. More recently it is reported an increase of the discrimination towards the "whites", specially among the teenagers. Some ethnic conflicts with the mauritanians were registered as well.

Thieves are becoming more frequent so as small robberies. The whites are becoming more and more a victim of this sneaky behavior. Houses and cars are broken, and this phenomenon is accompanying the overall process of urbanization. It is said that the arrival of refugees from Mali, Guinea Konacry, The Gambia and Senegal is related to the increase of small criminality. It can be expected that the appearance of the Television and the broadcast of "video garbages" will also stimulate the development of urban criminality.

The effects of the Structural Adjustment Programme sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is becoming visible, revealing a sharper difference between the better offs and the economically weaker groups. The latter are the ones most affected by the increase of unemployment, underpaid jobs, high prices of basic goods and a deteriorated housing conditions. This fact will certainly play a role in the development of urban violence.

The popular insatisfaction with the policies of the government and the errors made throughout the long lasting period of permanence of the PAIGC, as the only governing party, is creating another type of expectations which may build up potential violence.

On the one hand, there are already two opposition political parties organized and publicly recognized. Those who occupy posts in the government machinery and have demonstrated their sympathy to these parties have lost their privileges or were suspended from their duties. Persons involved with the organization of political demonstrations organized by these parties were harassed by the security forces of the government.

On the other, the PAIGC's unity has been shaken by the "manifest of the 121" which request urgent shifts of the party's policies and democratization of its decision making process. The struggle for power within the party structure has become visible.

All That shows that the process of democratization is not going very smooth.

At the daily life, a resident of the city will face other types of problems related to the provision of basic infrastructure.

Despite the positive changes introduced by the French group that took over the Water and Electricity company-EAGB, the supply of such basic commodities can become very scarce, specially during the dry season.

The inefficiency of the public machinery and underpaid personnel creates other ranges of problem and stimulate corruptive behaviour and patronage.

Most of the organizations for international cooperation that operate in Guinea-Bissau takes into consideration the range of difficulties one may find in the country when it concerns housing accomodations and living conditions. If a simple payment of a electricity bill can become a time consuming problem let us just imagine the problems caused by a week shortage of water and electricity which happened very often during the last three years.

I think that the SNV should look at this issue more carefully.

Some organizations try to provide a living condition in Bissau which can allow its employee to devote fulltime to his/her job and concentrate the attention to the development of his/her project. That means the guarantee of a water reservoir, a small standby generator, health care, a reasonable salary and logistic support.

My first house in Bissau was unsuitable for a family due to reasons which are out of the subject of this report however I was not allowed to move to a better place although there were alternatives available. Where is the rule that says that the SNVer has no freedom to decide about his living condition ? What are the limits and the standards which are considered the minimum acceptable by the organization ? How far should the situation go until the SNV will take action ? Why should you be placed in the peripheral zones of the city while there are houses available for the same price and even cheaper, and in better conditions in the central areas of the city ?

I am aware of the housing problems in Bissau, however it would be extremely positive if the SNVer could have just a little bit of freedom to decide about important items such as housing. Less of paternalism from the organization would also stimulate his self initiative concerning this aspect.

At last but not least, this whole housing affair was misused during my evaluation as an argument to judge negatively my adaptation in this country. I think my evaluators missed the point completely.

It was difficult to understand the intollerance and lack of sensibility of the SNV Bissau concerning my housing problem but thanks to my time consuming persistence I could finally succeed to move to a for me and my family suitable house.

No more time spent on solving household problems, something that is commonly seen among the SNVers in Bissau.

The organization wishes to professionalize itself and respond to the increasing demand for high qualified professionals from the part of the developing countries. To be able to offer better services and consequently better technical assistance the SNV will have to offer better employment conditions, and that includes the local living conditions as well.

It is very dangerous to generalize, but I have detected a lack of

quality of the work done by SNVers in Bissau.

The romantic approach of development is still alive although the sixties' fashion is already part of history.

The mentality of the stereotypical SNVer has not changed yet.

If the professionalization of the organization cannot come from the bottom to the top, it will have to happen the other way around.

11. List of Works and Activities undertaken by C. Acioly Jr.

1. Formulation of the standard questionnaire to be applied in the survey of the residents and inventory of the houses to be demolished in a sector of Mindará.\*
2. Application of the questionnaire and household interview (with Margarida Fonseca).
3. Formulation of the Housing Reconstruction Project (design, timetable) and its presentation to the residents.
4. Elaboration of the illustrations and drawings to inform the residents about the process of demolition and rebuilding of their houses.
5. Elaboration of the project of the house and its details.
6. Formulation of the preliminary Report on the Housing Reconstruction Project in Mindará (23-02), in Portuguese, explaining the methods, the analysis of the data collected and a cost analysis of the house.
7. Formulation of the Term of Compromise with the Residents of Mindará.\*
8. Coordination and full technical supervision of the implementation of the Mindará Housing Reconstruction Project (6 houses), including the guidance to the workers, articulation with the topography sector of the Municipality, individual meetings with the residents, supply of building materials...
9. Formulation of the contract to be signed between the PMBB and the residents of Mindará, 1st version.\*
10. Formulation of the final version of the contract to be signed between the PMBB and the residents of Mindará, with the assistance of a lawyer contracted by the project.\*
11. Formulation of the Term of Reference for a Pilot Programme for financing building material (26-04) which was sent to the Municipality of Bissau and to the National Bank.
12. Presentation of the Mindará Housing Project to the Municipality of Bissau.
13. Formulation of a summary report about the result of the Household Interview in Mindará, in order to judge the efficiency of a cost recovery calculation.
14. Illustration of the folder: Fontanários do nosso Bairro, spread in the neighbourhood of Belém during the campaign "A água é boa".\*
15. Formulation of a report with some suggestions for study themes to the specialization course of Vicente Tito in the IHS (25-07).
16. Formulation of a letter of intention for an agreement between the PMBB and the Conselho de Moradores de Cupilom de Cima (5-06)\*
17. Formulation of the term of compromise which was signed between the PMBB and the Conselho de Moradores de Cupilom de Cima.\*
18. Formulation of the report "Cleaning the Valetas: a proposal for an action plan in Mindará" (21-7).
19. Working inspection in Mindará (20-07).
20. Formulation of a draft Report on the Housing Improvement Project in Mindará (15-07), which was presented to the coordination of the Infrastructure Relief Project, PASI, financed by the World Bank.
- 20.a Replacement of the project coordinator during his "verlof" (jul-aug/89).
21. Formulation of a report about the activities of the PMBB during



- the period I replaced the project coordinator (19-07 to 11-08).
22. Supervision and guidance of the field work during the elaboration of the maquete by Vicente Tito.
  23. Field work, survey and inventory of the physical conditions of the neighbourhood of Cupilom de Cima, as a preparation for the formulation of the settlement plan (with Luuk Moes and Vicente Tito, may-august/89)
  24. Formulation of the urban design and plan of Cupilom de Cima.
  25. Elaboration of the illustrations, drawings, transparencies, slide series, which were used during the presentation of the plan in a meeting with the Residents' Council of Cupilom de Cima.
  26. Presentation of the plan of Cupilom de Cima to the Residents' Council of that neighbourhood.
  27. Presentation of the plan for the house owners of the first 9 houses demolished in Cupilom de Cima, in a meeting organized by the project and the Residents' Council.
  26. Formulation of a proposal for an intervention in the neighbourhood of Reino-Gambeafada. The Municipality of Bissau presented to the Infrastructure Relief Project-PASI (World Bank) in order to define the use of part of the budget addressed to the popular neighbourhoods (400.000,00 US\$), in collaboration with L. Moes and Eng. Fernando Jorge (CMB).
  27. Formulation of a proposal for a general repair and road renewal in Mindará, upon request of the Technical Office of the PASI. The proposal was intended to be included in the program of activities of PASI, made in collaboration with L. Moes.
  28. Presentation of the plan of Cupilom de Cima to the Municipality's Urbanism sector.
  - 28.1 Formulation of the "Eerste Ervaringsverslag", presented to SNV Bissau.
  29. Elaboration of the standard questionnaire "Inventário das casas no Bairro de Cupilom", which was used in the whole survey of the residents and in the inventory of the houses selected for demolition.
  30. Formulation of the report of the Cupilom de Cima Project, the plan of action, strategies, goals, cost analysis, drawings, detail plans, etc...\* (Oct/90)
  31. Formulation of a report, which included recommendations to the construction supervisor, location plans of each of the 9 houses selected for demolition, sketches showing the size of the plots, plotation, distances, etc... on a scale of 1:1000 and 1:100. (Jan/90)
  32. On site supervision of the demolition and reconstruction of the first 9 houses in Cupilom de Cima. They were demolished in order to allow the implementation of the roads and infrastructure networks. Assistance given to Bart Peters and Aliu Mané (Jan-Feb/90)
  33. Formulation of a report of the daily occurrences (diário de obras) in the housing activities in Cupilom (9 houses) and in Belém where the project built 3 extra houses (fev-may/90)
  34. Assistance to the animation sector during the contacts with the residents in Cupilom de Cima, individual discussions with the house owners, meetings with the PAIGC Cupilom section committee and with the Residents' Committee.

35. Realization and idealization of a video film, made in collaboration with Sidi Jaquité, animator of the project. The film was exhibited in general meetings with the residents and explains the components of the project, its strategies and approaches, the demands on the residents, etc...
36. Assistance given to the project coordinator while receiving foreign missions coming from USA (RUDO, USAID), Holland (Embassy Dakar and DGIS), USA (World Bank, FENU, UNDP), Ivory Coast (BAD), Nairobi (UNCHS).
37. Formulation of the first concept of the seminar organized by the project.\* May/90
38. Appointed to represent the project in a public debate about neighbourhood upgrading which was organized and broadcasted alive by the Guinean Television Station. May/90.
39. Formulation of an information folder, in Portuguese, with detailed information about the project, illustrations, photos, maps, etc... This was included in the file of the papers which were presented in the seminar. Jun/90.
40. Formulation of the themes, identification of possible guests, contacts, formulation of memos, invitation formularies, list of participants, contact to arrange the auditorium, meetings with the Ministry of Public Works and Mayor of Bissau, and all preparation works to realize the seminar.\* Jun-jul/90.
41. Full cooperation with project coordinator, H. Gijsselhart, before and during the development of the seminar.
42. Supervision given to S. Jaquité during the publication of the papers presented at the seminar. Sept/90
43. Preparation and idealization of a exhibition of the project works and achievements. Ideas, plans, sketches, photographs, maquettes, all put in panels. Guidance to Vicente Tito and to carpenter Antonio Biague.\* Sept/90
44. Preparation of the lecture of the project, in full collaboration with project coordinator, H. Gijsselhart, selection and organization of a slide series, guidance to animator S. Jaquité, and its presentation at the seminar made in collaboration with Gijsselhart and Jaquité.\* Oct/90
45. Formulation of the conclusion report of the seminar, in collaboration with Rui Barai and complete supervision of its publication. Oct/90.
46. Organization of the seminar file which includes all communications, memos, invitations, sketches, papers, photographs, all stored in a computer file and an archive map.
47. Supervision, field check and guidance to Vicente Tito and Sidi Jaquité during field survey and housing inventory of the 45 houses included in the second phase of the Cupilom Project.
48. Preparation and formulation of the plan of operation for the second phase of Cupilom: the housing demolition and reconstruction program and the set up of the assisted self-help program.\* Nov-Dec/90.
49. Formulation of the program of activities for the animation section of the project and direct guidance to Sidi Jaquité and Ansumane Sanhá. Elaboration of all drawings, illustrations and texts in transparencies which were used during the meetings with the residents, divided in groups per geographical location in the

- settlement. Nov-Dec/90.
50. Formulation of a detail plan (sketches) for the location of each of the 26 houses and the limits of their plot, in a scale of 1:500. Jan-Jun/91.
  - 50.a Elaboration of the design of the prototype two store house (residential + commerce), and detail of the special roof solution. Guidance to carpenter Antonio Biague in the elaboration of a 1:20 maquete.
  51. Field check, topographic measures, survey of the open areas after demolition of the houses in order to give a feed back to the elaboration of the detail location plans of the houses. Jan-Jul/91.
  52. Assistance to Bart Peters during the demarcation of some plots and occasional supervision during reconstruction. Jan-Jul/91.
  53. Meetings with residents, with the PAIGC committee and with the Residents' committee in order to solve the conflicts about the size of the houses, its location, the plot size, demarcation, payment demands, etc... Assistance given to Sidi Jaquité. Jan-Jul/91.
  54. Articulation with the various departments of the Municipality in order to guarantee the good functioning of the housing program in the field. Elaboration of memos and different short reports about the critical points of the housing program. Jan/Nov/91.
  55. Articulation and preparation of a series of 4 meetings between the project, the Ministry of Public Works and the Municipality in order to discuss the future of the project, new neighbourhoods of intervention, new institutional framework, possible new approaches, a council of urbanization, etc... Assistance to Vicente Tito during the presentation of the new plan formulated for Mindará. Collection of the negatives of the airphotos in order to be blown up in Holland. Formulation of the reports about each meeting. Feb, March, May/1991.
  56. Formulation of a preliminary draft report about the second phase of the project, 1992-1996, presented to the project team. March/91.
  57. Formulation of a proposal for the cooperation between the project and the Technical Department of the Municipality during the process of formulation of the intervention plan in the neighbourhood of Cupilom de Baixo. May/91.
  58. Assistance to H. Gijselhart and to J. Lopes in the formulation of the responses of the project towards the problem created by former project building supervisor Aliu Mané.
  59. Formulation of the final report "The Neighbourhood Upgrading Project of Bissau: a second phase proposal", in cooperation with project coordinator H. Gijselhart, which was submitted to DGIS and to SNV. \* May/91.
  60. Formulation of a proposal of a Council of Urbanization in Bissau, in cooperation with H. Gijselhart, which was presented to the Ministry of Public Works and discussed in two different meetings with the Ministry and with the Municipality: the new institutional framework through which the project will operate from now onwards.\*
  61. Formulation of the final report of Cupilom de Cima, volume II: the urban plan, the land use plan, the existing situation, proposal of

- a building and urban regulation, a five year organogram of activities, a photo documentation, and a series of guidelines to the Municipality and the Ministry of Public Works. July-Ago/91.
62. Preparation of the program of the "Formulation mission of Mr. C. Beeker", formulation of a list of points to be discussed with the Municipality and the Ministry of Public Works, discussions with the Municipality about the future of the project, all in cooperation with project coordinator G. Derkzen. Ago-Set/91.
  63. Formulation of an improved Portuguese version of the Second Phase proposal (Acioly-Gijselhart english report) and its delivery to the different institutions involved with the project, and its discussion with the Municipality. Ago/91.
  64. Represented the project in a debate which took part the mayor of Bissau and the president of the Cupilom de Cima neighbourhood Committee, broadcasted together with a program about the project by the Guinean Television Station. Ago/91.
  65. Represented the project in the seminar organized by the Ministry of Public Works in order to discuss the first proposal of the master plan of Bissau. Ago/91.
  66. Carried out discussions with with a portuguese mission sponsored by the World Bank with the objective to analyse the functionality of the Municipality, its tax system and book keeping. Sep-Oct/90.
  67. Formulated a report about the potentials and limitations of self-help housing in Bissau. A preliminary evaluation of the housing component of the project was ellaborated together with a photo documentation, and a series of recommendations were presented in the paper. The paper was intended to be presented in the seminar about the national housing policy. October/91.
  68. Formulated a technical response about the sites & services project of Antula Bono financed by the UNDP, World Bank and FENU. The response was based on the analysis of the draft project report and it was requested by the mayor of Bissau. October/91.
  69. Represented the project in the a "round table" organized by the Ministry of Public Works and the World Bank in order to discuss the national housing policy. Nov/91.
  70. Accompanied the project coordinator, G. Derkzen, in a meeting called by the UNDP-Bissau which took part the representative of the UN in Bissau, the staff of the UNDP, the coodination of the World Bank's PASI-Social and Infrastructure Relief Project. The meeting was organized in order to discuss the sites & services Antula Bono project. Mr. Derkzen was representing the SNV.
  71. Supervision and guidance to animator Sidi Jaquité during field survey in the neighbourhood of Reino-Gambeafada. Oct-Nov/91.
  72. Supervision and guidance to draftsman, Eduardo Sanca, during field survey in the neighbourhood of Cupilom de Baixo, and during the ellaboration of the settlement maps. Oct-Nov/91.
  73. Field survey and guidance to Edna Medina during visits in Reino-Gambeafada. Analysis of the data collected by Sidi Jaquité, analysis of part of the data stored in the project's computer selected from the 7 neighbourhood field survey.
  74. Formulation of a preliminary report about the neighbourhood of Reino-Gambeafada. The report presents an analysis of the area, identification of problems, a photo documentation, identification of the socio-economic background of the inhabitants and at last,

it presents some recommendations for future actions in the neighbourhood. Oct-Dez/91.

75. Formulation of memos, technical responses, short reports about the problems faced by the project in Cupilom de Cima.
76. Appointed by the Minister of Public Works as a member of the Commission which was formed to judge the proposals presented by Guinean architects at a housing project competition sponsored by the MOPCU and the Republic of Taiwan. Nov-Dec/91.
77. Making of a film
78. Formulation of the present final report which was presented to SNV Bissau.

\* These reports were submitted to the Director of the Project who gave his comments and contribution.

Bissau, 23 of December 1991.