Chapter 5[1]

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN SLUM UPGRADING AND ITS RELEVANCE TO IRAQ

5.1   Preamble

This chapter presents a brief review of the international experience with slum upgrading depicting a historical development of the policy approaches and underscoring successes and failures observed in some countries and/or cities where the policy was applied. It also makes an attempt to assess to which extent the bulk of experience and lessons learned are relevant to a country with the specificities and peculiarities of Iraq. There is an attempt to single out what can be adapted and transferred to the situation of Iraq taking into account the inherent limitations of a country embarked into a post-war process of nation building.

Slum upgrading is not a new panacea. It is in fact an old idea and policy with different denominations but put into practice in a significant number of countries for the last 4 decades. Since the late 1960's when informal housing and informal land development was first internationally acknowledged not as problem but as a solution for low income residents[2] – through the work of John Turner in the "barreadas" of Peru – one can affirm without hesitation that the wealth of experience with informal settlement upgrading provides sufficient evidences of the appropriateness of this policy.

Nevertheless upgrading policies have always been subject to controversies and debates between two opposing camps in all the cities and/or countries where it was pursued as well as in the international literature. It is likely that this will not be different in Iraq.

One camp defends upgrading as an approach that builds upon the creativity, social networks and material and financial efforts of the residents – without involvement of the State – in building their own residential spaces regardless of its legal tenure and planning status. It is argued that there is a very high opportunity costs for not pursuing upgrading. Upgrading is seen as a vehicle to help consolidating human settlements that are built spontaneously without the need for large-scale public investments and capital disbursement. Simply because it takes into account the residents' own efforts and financial investments, it is carried out incrementally, involves the residents and their social organisations and it builds upon the specificities of the urban configurations and settlement patterns when laying down networks of infrastructure, roads and overall public services. Thus maximising what is in place and increasing the sense of belonging, ownership and co-responsibility amongst the residents. It builds upon the creativity and capital investment of the poor.

The other camp commonly argues that the illegal and informal character of land occupation and the spontaneous manner through which land is subdivided and occupied via ad-hoc building – in total infringement with the legal and planning frameworks in place – are not entitled to government intervention. Thus it is not justified by any argument because in reality such intervention materialises government recognition to illegality that will indirectly stimulate more informality in housing and land development. It is argued that these settlements must be demolished and their residents resettled in newly built neighbourhoods and public housing estates where living and housing conditions are provided according to the norms in a planned and formalised residential area. It is argued that the standardized construction of residential buildings carried out by modern professional construction companies are much more cost-effective than any other option of upgrading and land regularisation.

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[1] This text is an extract from the "Slum Upgrading Strategy Paper for Iraq", prepared for the UN Habitat, Amman, and the Government of Iraq, by Claudio Acioly Jr. and David Sims.
[2] Favelas (Brazil), barreadas (Peru), gecekondus (Turkey), biddonvilles (Franco Africa), Aashwa'I (Egypt) are just some of the local denominations of slums and squatter settlements.

This controversy has not ended. However, evidences from Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Colombia, Cuba, Zambia, Ghana and Kenya just to mention a few countries reveal that informal urbanisation has not ceased despite large scale government provision of housing and the implementation of policies of relocation of informal settlements carried out during a certain period in time. On the contrary, its scope and scale has just gained in magnitude and complexity. This is a trend confirmed by the UN Habitat report on slum in the world. There are nearly 1 billion people living in slums in the world of today. Evidences from Iraq seem to point in the same direction.

These unequivocal evidences have encouraged governments, bilateral and multilateral agencies to abandon resettlement, eviction and demolition policies and to adopt policies of upgrading that recognises the rights of low-income residents and the development potentials that these settlements represent vis-à-vis social networks, income generation, accessibility to services and social cohesion.

Additionally, lessons learned from 4 decades of development and researches in informal settlements in a variety of countries indicate that there is a need to pursue both curative and preventive policies simultaneously[3]. In other words policies that give responses to increasing demographic pressure and demand for housing and infrastructure combined with policies that alleviate and improve the living conditions of those families already living in existing informal settlements. This is the only way to reduce the pace of informal urbanisation and the rapid increase of new informal settlements. Thus there is a need to pursue housing policies that includes but not limited to upgrading, resettlement – when needed –, land regularisation, public provision of housing and other specific policies dealing with access to serviced land and overall policies that enable the housing sector to work properly both for the poor and other social-economic groups.

5.2   Review of Policies
When looking at more than 4 decades of international experience with upgrading one comes to some ordinary verification that may be very informative and useful for urban policy makers and housing practitioners of Iraq:

1.   The wording "upgrading" has evolved from settlement upgrading, towards squatter upgrading, informal settlement upgrading, integration of informal settlements and the more recently acclaimed 'slum upgrading'. Each has a specific connotation and practical outcomes. In the beginning the focus was more on physical upgrading and improvement in infrastructure. Gradually it starts including social development issues such as community participation and employment as a result of greater awareness about the integrated character of area-based development processes. Cost recovery has always remained as an intention but was hardly or never realized.

2.   Roughly one can identify 3 generations of projects: (1) Single project – settlement based – designed to improve infrastructure provision and accessibility, with minor relocation of units as measure to reduce density and facilitate access; (2) Projects – focusing on set of settlements – designed in combination with sites & services schemes to where those residents who were living in pathways of infrastructure and roads were relocated. Projects linked with building materials credit, cost recovery strategies and policy and institutional reforms; (3) city-wide upgrading programmes – programme approach focusing on all informal areas in the city – designed as an integration approach to bring these areas to formal housing and real estate markets. A strong discourse towards legalisation of tenure, focusing on improvement of public space and stimulating housing improvement as an individual owners' responsibility.

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[3] *Acioly, Claudio (2003). "The Rationale of Informal Settlements Regularisation Projects: from settlement upgrading to integration approaches. Introductory Notes. Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies-IHS and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Acioly, Claudio (1997). "The Rationale of Informal Settlements Upgrading. Introductory Notes". Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies – IHS. December 1997. Mimeo.*

3.   The practical meaning of slum upgrading has also evolved from infrastructure improvement packages without much concern for the urban configuration and settlement design, towards integrated projects that includes re-blocking and settlement planning in addition to infrastructure improvement programmes and citizen participation. Gradually the issue of capacity building of residents were becoming part of the project packages. More recently there is greater attention paid to legalisation of land tenure with the belief that security of tenure will increase residents' confidence, mobilise private investment and stimulate residents to invest their own resources on housing improvement. Thus releasing governments from actual involvement in housing production and concentrating public resources on financing infrastructure provision and improvement in public space, roads, amenities, etc. Community participation has been included as an integral part all along these models of upgrading.

4.   A historical review of upgrading experiences shows that due to the fact that these settlements were often informally developed upgrading policies commonly included the legalisation of tenure and the regularisation of the settlement. However, the achievement of this goal has remained exception rather than the rule. Time consuming, costly and cumbersome administrative procedures to regularise informally occupied plots have resulted in meagre results regarding legalisation.

5.   There is a clear evolution from a project-based intervention towards city-wide programmes, implying that there is a much greater concern with institutional and organisational arrangements within existing local government structures in order to manage and finance large scale upgrading operations.

6.   In organisational and management terms, there is a noticeable evolution in the way these projects and programmes are being planned and managed. In a great number of countries, particularly in Africa and some Asian countries, projects were placed under central government coordinating responsibilities and had the ambition to replicate nationally once it succeeded in one or two major centres. In the first generation of projects, the establishment of project groups or project coordinating units were the common set up. These proved to have short lives once the project cycled ended. Gradually, this moved to the creation of special task agencies with specific mandates and working closely with or embedded into local government structures. The last generation of projects are placed under existing local government structures – in line with waves of decentralisation – thus maximizing chances to institutionalise within the local level.

7.   Inner city slums have evolved from typical processes of inner city decay, abandonment and derelict land but very often through a process of displacement of original residents by a population of tenants. Tenement housing typically rented occupied by low income families became the typology of slums in many inner cities. This has required very specific policies that encompass expropriation measures, involvement of occupants, building rehabilitation and re-conversion in use.

8.   International funding agencies such as the Inter American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and the World Bank are engaged in financing and promoting city-wide upgrading programmes thus requiring a much more sophisticated programme management and financial reporting from local governments. This has revealed the need for substantial capacity building and training even in countries and local governments where relatively well-trained technical cadre does exist.

9.   Innovation in policies of upgrading in a number of countries must be accounted to influences played by bilateral agencies and international cooperation. Agencies like DANIDA, GTZ and SIDA just to mention a few have promoted and co-financed upgrading projects providing direct technical and financial assistance in project design, management and implementation. Many "pilot" initiatives intended to create breeding grounds for replication and multiplication. However, very often these initiatives did not up-scale nor institutionalised once international involvement ceased.

This had a lot to do with the fact that hybrid organisations and ad-hoc implementation arrangements were created within local administrative structures that did not bare a view on sustainability.

7.3   *Ongoing International Efforts*

The international community lead by the United Nations agreed on the Millennium Agenda. The Target 11 of Millennium Development Goal 7 calls for a 'significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers up to the year 2020'. With the number of slum dwellers rapidly increasing world wide, improvements in their housing conditions, access to services and infrastructure present a great challenge. This has generated great international interest for the problem of slums resulting in more efforts in resource mobilisation and political commitment as well as awareness of the size and scope of the problem. But it also underscored the critical need for policy changes and the development of new approaches that can give a sustainable response to this problem[4].

For present day Iraq, given the current process of post war reconstruction, the target 11 of the MDG 7 represents an additional challenge. It is not only a question of improving the conditions of existing slums and dilapidated neighbourhoods but also to restore a significant part of the war-damaged housing stock in these areas.

Meeting target 11 of MDG 7 in Iraq requires the government to take a series of measures in the fields of problem assessment, monitoring, policy making, resource mobilisation, capacity and institution building, and project implementation arrangements. The ability of institutions to design, implement and manage large-scale slum improvement programmes is crucial to start spending financial resources. This absorption capacity is crucial to convince the international community of Iraq's ability to tackle the problems of slums in a sustained manner. In addition to that, a great challenge will be to build citizen confidence on government and public policies as well as their own self-esteem. The capacity and ability of citizens and their social organisations to participate – and contribute – to slum improvement programmes is equally important for a country like Iraq. Thus the focus is to develop capacities both on government and civil society sides.

5.4   *International experiences*

As previously stated, there is a wealth of international experience from which one can learn and take advantage when designing specific policies to locally resolve the problems of slums and informal urbanisation. No doubt that Iraq can benefit from that. Each case has its own strength and for the purpose of this report we will list just a few issues related to some cases that can enlighten Iraq policy makers and provide useful lessons.

One can draw lessons from a countless of experiences with large-scale programmes developed and implemented in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Lusaka (Zambia), Indonesia (KIP-Kampung Improvement Programme), Medellin (Colombia), Rosario (Argentina), Mumbay and Ahmedabad (India), and Andhra Pradesh, India (APUSP). In addition there are project initiatives in Egypt, Jordan, Iran, South Africa, Thailand and Tanzania just to mention a few.

In terms of citywide approaches, the Inter American Development Bank-IADB promotes the "Favela-Bairro Programme" executed by the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, as the example to be pursued by Latin American countries. It is worth to elaborate on this experience and see what can be valuable for Iraq given the scale, budget, implementation arrangements and the size and complexity of the problem that the programme deals with[5].

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[4] *UN Millennium Project (2005). "A Home in the City. Task Force on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers". 158 pp. UNCHS (2003) "Guide to Monitoring Target 11: Improving the lives of 100 Million slum dwellers".UN-Habitat.*

[5] *Acioly Jr., Claudio et al. (1999). Sustainable Urban Development and the Urban Poor in Rio de Janeiro, in 'The Challenge of Environmental Management in Urban Areas', M. Mattingly, E. Fernandes, J. Davila and A. Atkinson (eds), Ashgate, London, UK, 1999. (pp. 127-138).*

Unfortunately a lot of post implementation research and documentation about the programme remain in a great deal inaccessible to a wide international public due to the language barriers. Despite the uniqueness of a series of aspects of the programme, we see a number of similar policies and programmes being developed and implemented elsewhere in Latin America that are clearly inspired on Rio's upgrading programme thanks to the role played by the IADB. But also in other places such as Morocco. *What is relevant of this programme for a country like Iraq?*

5.5   *Citywide Slum Upgrading in a Mega city like Rio de Janeiro*
The programme is lead by the Municipal government's housing department (Municipal Secretariat of Housing-SMH) and is part of a broad municipal housing policy that addresses housing needs of various target groups e.g. residents of slums-Favelas, residents of risk areas, residents of public housing estates in process of decay, civil servants, middle class housing, etc. Thus the slum improvement programme is just one of the various programmes carried out by the municipality since 1993. *The most relevant contribution of this case is that it tackles the problem of slum within a framework of a municipal housing policy, with one existing municipal institution in charge of the programme and with a clear institutional frameworks.*

Another aspect that helps to explain the relative success of the programme is the continuity in the policy and technical cadre involved directly with the different projects throughout one decade of programme implementation despite the election of different mayors. The success and high level of acceptance of the programme within the population of the city helped to coin continuity via de municipal elections when the citizens elected a mayor belonging to the governing party for the first time in the history of the city. The mayor who actually started the programme in 1993 had his successor coming from his political party and has succeeded to get re-elected himself in the 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. *Thus guaranteeing full continuity of staff and policy is sine-qua-non condition for successful programme and project implementation dealing with slums.*

Another aspect relates to resource mobilisation. Nearly 60% of the budget is funded by the municipality's own resources and 40% from a loan from the IADB. The peculiarity is that the Brazilian municipalities – due to their remarkable political, administrative and financial autonomy – are entitled to acquire loan directly from banks and capital markets. We are talking about a total figure of US$ 350 million only for the first phase of the programme. It is actually one the largest public investment programmes on low-income residential areas ever been implemented in the history of Rio de Janeiro. *Thus, access to financial resources is a fundamental pre-condition to design a large-scale slum improvement programme that does not run the risk of discontinuation.*

Another important lesson is the programme management approach put into place and within an existing municipal structure. A programme coordination was established and a matrix type of project management structure was set up with project managers appointed to each slum area and who becomes responsible for the entire project cycle until the contract is signed for implementation. At times project managers take more than one slum area under his/her responsibility. It is also possible that the project manager gets involved as project manager at the implementation stage thus supervising – on behalf of the municipal government – the entire implementation works. Many – if not all – of these project managers went to training and participated in additional capacity building initiatives geared to develop skills and knowledge in project planning, project management and project appraisal and impact assessment.

One of the innovations of this programme was the process of project formulation that seems to attract many governments elsewhere in the world. The municipal government launched the programme in an open competition organised in cooperation with the National Institute of Architects of Brazil, calling planning and architectural offices to come up with ideas and methodologies to tackle the problems found in 89 prioritised slums in the city. Nearly 60 propositions were presented from which 12 were selected. From that moment onwards, the instrument of public tendering for project formulation was used. It is worth noting that the municipality had developed a cadastre of all slums in the city resulting in a complete social

economic survey, aerial and satellite photographs of each of the nearly 600 slum areas and a set of topographic and cartographic data allowing project developers to count on relative reliable information prior to starting with project design. *This is a sine-qua-non condition for any slum improvement programme to succeed anywhere.*

The winning firm had the obligation to work closely with the Community-based organisation of the slums and with the project manager appointed by the municipal housing secretariat. The winning firm had to carried out field surveys, organise interim presentations in the community as well as in the municipal government. The project manager assured that the reporting and communication about the project within the public sector and the community run in a transparent and efficient manner. The internal approvals of different municipal secretariats involved in the different projects e.g. public works, safety regulations, education and health services, etc. was a primary responsibility of project managers. *Thus, the lesson here is that the appointment of an individual manager – belonging to and fully acquainted with the municipality's civil servant system – with a recognised mandate and authority and who had easy access to decision making levels as well as to the entire municipal apparatus was another fundamental condition for the successful implementation of different projects carried out simultaneously.*

Once the project was sufficiently detailed and ready for implementation, another public tendering was organised for construction and execution works. Construction firms were called for bidding and usually price and expertise determined the decision in favour of one proposal. Some firms had some experience in slum areas while others had never entered into the peculiarities of implementing public works, pavement and other constructions in an urban setting so peculiar as a Rio de Janeiro's Favela. At times the topography presented nearly 45% inclination given the fact that the settlements were situated on a hill.

The result of this tendering – for both project design and project implementation – was that local capacities and expertise in slum projects were significantly developed and refined in the city both within the public and private sectors. The design of public tendering, selection procedures, contract management, etc. had to be in place. In addition the programme helped in providing employment opportunities and generating jobs to a large spectrum of the population including from the slums itself. *This type of private sector participation – allowing project developers and construction companies to get involved in slum upgrading – was another important element that helped with the success of the programme since it released the public sector from tasks that can be better performed by the private sector. Thus placing the monitoring and quality control responsibilities onto the municipal government where it can play its best.*

But what went wrong with the programme? What can Iraq learn from this?

The municipal secretariat proved to be unprepared to absorb the financial management and reporting responsibilities required by a funding agency as the IADB. Difficulties arose in the management of such a large-scale programme and urban operations involving simultaneous projects and several different stakeholders from the community, private and public sectors. The municipality had to resource to a management consultant firm that helped the municipal secretariat in preparing the financial reports and project reports. This created a power layer in-between project managers and programme management that provoked frictions when approval, adjustments and negotiations between parties took place at the project level. Consequently, inefficiencies were recorded in various levels. Thus, the municipality did not really properly assess its own capabilities to cope with the demands from a funding agency and did not measure with precision the scope and magnitude of the operations it was entering with the programme. *The important lesson is that a municipal government must design a management system and identify all activities and tasks required and assess which in-house capacities it has and which ones it needs to develop or contract out.*

Another bottleneck was that the IADB set requirements for disbursement that are not at all compatible with the nature of slum upgrading projects. Everyone knows that despite the accuracy of cartography, topography, aerial and satellite-based images it is almost impossible not to encounter problems with the location of a building when implementing a road or

infrastructure network. What appears to be a free pathway is in fact a pathway blocked by a part of a building not really detected in the mapping. This means that projects are never final until they are actually implemented on the ground. The IADB required final project layouts, plotting and clear divisions of public and private domains that were impossible to be provided at the level of accuracy required. Thus causing delays and stress amongst municipal officials. *The lesson here is to establish a clear agreement on what to expect in terms of levels of accuracy in project design and documentation for financial disbursements.*

The participation of the population in project design and project management was limited. The senior staff of the municipality involved in programme coordination argues that the presence of criminal organisations in the majority of the slum areas inhibiting and intimidating local leadership made broad-based participation impossible. One the unwritten goals of the programme was to re-establish the presence of the State in public service provision and law enforcement as a way to neutralise the influence of these organisations. This goal meant that citizen participation had become secondary. This limitation has resulted in weak sense of ownership of the public investments carried out in the areas and little commitment with post-implementation maintenance of public spaces and amenities introduced by the programme. *The lesson here is that a comprehensive stakeholders and institutional assessment must be done prior to project commencement as a vehicle to identify problems, potentials and ways forward and as a way to trigger a broad-based stakeholders consultation. This will guarantee that bottlenecks are clarified at the start, social mobilisation is given a chance and local social organisations can get involved from scratch.*

Another aspect less successful is the lack of clear arrangements made for public space management and the maintenance of the services, infrastructure and public investments made in these areas. Field visits carried out couple of years after the implementation of the first projects reveal that municipal agencies are still not taking care of the public goods in the improved slums – today called neighbourhoods – as it does in other 'formal' areas of the city. Some degree of deterioration in pavement, squares and public lighting shows that maintenance is not taken care of. *Thus the lesson is that governments must involved local stakeholders, social organisations, citizens and their representatives in a dialogue with public agencies in charge of maintenance during the process of project implementation so that systems and commitments – as well as financial contributions – can be agreed upon and put into practice when project activities cease.*

5.6   Multi-city Integrated Slum Improvement Programme – Andhra Pradesh
APUSP-Andhra Pradesh Urban Services for the Poor Project is an initiative of the state government of Andhra Pradesh (India) in collaboration with the United Kingdom Department of International Development – DFID focusing on cities of the India State of Andhra Pradesh where 60 million inhabitants live. The 'provincial' scope of the programme and the way it was set up make it a very interesting case for anyone interested in slum upgrading programmes that have both a social and institutional development goal.

APUSP programme has a budget of nearly £ 100 million (Sterling Pounds) and it was originated from the Slum Improvement Projects (SIP's). It started in 2000 and was designed to address the problems derived from rapid urbanisation of 1st class cities, inadequate services and increasing environmental impacts, widespread poverty and the limited capacity of governments to plan and respond to these problems.

It is interesting that APUSP combines institutional reforms geared to improve performance of local governments with the delivery of environmental infrastructure to slum communities and the strengthening of civil society and citizen participation in decision-making. Municipalities are compelled to design participatory approaches and bring the poor into decision-making via the design of MAPP-Municipal Action Plan for Poverty Reduction. Municipalities can only access funds to sustain their infrastructure needs if they achieve governance goals e.g. transparency, citizen participation, accountability in MAPP's as well as performance improvements and municipal reforms.

The environmental infrastructure package encompasses water, sanitation, drainage, roads and footpaths, solid waste management and street lighting. Thus from one view point APUSP

can be regarded as an infrastructure improvement programme in slum areas. However, it has a strong capacity building component that tackles equally both the technical cadre of local governments, municipal councillors – politicians – and community-based organisations and local community leaders.

APUSP was launched by the Honourable Chief Minister in September 2000 and within a short period of time introductory workshops were held for all Municipalities of the State. In addition basic MAPP guidelines were drafted and piloted in 3 towns and implementation started thereafter in pilot towns.

The results after 3 years time shows that the 3 pilot towns have produced clear, logical and well presented basic MAPP documents that provides all stakeholders with an excellent set of information. The preparation process was participatory and according to guidelines resulting in slum residents getting actually involved in programme formulation. The process showed clearly that municipalities need intensive support when engaging into dialogues with civil society actors. When looking at the way the guidelines were used and understood by the various community and public sector actors, it becomes clear that the guidelines need to be streamlined with:
- more structured methodology for municipal reform strategy;
- clearer link required for revenue improvement and improved services
- criteria for linked infrastructure
- environmental assessment to be included

For Iraq, this programme reveals some interesting lessons. The most important is the need to combine capacity building of various actors – including politicians and decision makers – when new policies are introduced. Another interesting element has to do with the reward principle that establishes that municipalities can only have access to infrastructure funds if they actually design and practice participatory approaches and municipal reforms geared to public sector performance improvements. Government funding is not geared to housing production – benefits of individual families – but to infrastructure improvement programmes meaning that scarce public resources are maximized and have greater impacts amongst the poor population as a whole. Thus propelling improvements in living conditions in the city.

Another interesting aspect of the programme is that a core team of capacity builders were established with the main task to design, coordinate and deliver workshops, training materials, information dissemination and keep with a continuous process of capacity building of the major stakeholders in the State. This seems to be very important when up-scaling slum upgrading programme. In another section of this report we will focus on capacity building, institutional development and training that Iraq certainly needs.

5.7 Post-war Reconstruction of Rotterdam: a multi-year integrated urban renewal programme

Rotterdam (650,000 inhabitants), Netherland's second largest city and Europe's largest port and until 2004 the largest port in the world, provides an interesting lesson for any city confronted with a post-conflict reconstruction. Although it differs significantly from Iraq or any other city in the Developing world, Rotterdam offers a remarkable example showing how a pro-active local government and a dynamic multi-year urban renewal policy and inner city development strategy can result into a successful revival of the city economy and its built-up stock.

On 10th May 1940, a German bombardment devastated 260 ha of the city center destroying 166,700 buildings and 17.2/% of the total housing stock (nearly 30,000 units) in addition to loss of human lives. The municipal government's planning team started brainstorming and preparing a plan about 2 weeks thereafter simultaneously to a large expropriation operation and large scale land acquisition to safeguard municipal control on the reconstruction process. A number of urban plans were formulated envisioning the future of the city in an era of automobile, prioritizing vehicular circulation and mixed land use zoning.

As the years passed by, policies to recapture the city economy through the port revitalization and modernization simultaneously to build a strong, multi-functional and vibrant inner city were designed and tireless pursued. In the 1970's an urban renewal strategy – very similar to what we know today as citywide upgrading programme – was designed and carried out during the years to come up to the end of the 1990's in order to tackle the problem of dilapidated neighbourhoods, urban decay and slums found in the pre-war districts of the city. Thus one can speak of simultaneous implementation of reconstruction and renewal policies. The success of the urban renewal programme had a lot to do with the institutional, organizational and managerial setting that was established to manage a citywide and muti-neighbourhood urban renewal approach. Similar to Rio de Janeiro – but 20 years earlier – Rotterdam established a matrix organization structure and created decentralized project groups per district with one project manager in charge of all area-based activities. The project manager was the key figure that safeguarded cohesion, articulation and prompt coordination within the municipal apparatus.

The policies, plans as well as the strategies were continuously reviewed and updated and put to scrutiny of the population and social organizations. Thus, citizen participation was another cornerstone of the process. Besides that, the municipality restructured its organization and created a City Development Agency (OBR-Rotterdam Development Corporation) that act as publicly owned developer in charge of planning, initiating and managing investment programmes in the city. OBR managed to get the private sector involved in various inner city development and real estate initiatives and a specific housing policy was designed to encourage higher income groups to settle and live in the inner city areas.

All in all, the experience of the reconstruction process of Rotterdam can be illustrated in the following diagram showing the various steps and important components of the strategy.

Figure 7.1: Post-war Reconstruction of Rotterdam

For Iraq, the Rotterdam experience is an inspiration from a city rebuilt from the ashes to become a dynamic urban center playing a fundamental role in the Netherlands' economy. In managerial terms, the lesson is that institutional and civil servant structures of municipal governments are not always prepared to undertake large-scale operations. There is a need

for adjustment, change in attitudes and flexibility in planning and organizational structure. Thus it is not a question of only rebuilding the stock that has been destroyed or damaged and maintaining and repairing what is subject to the effects of time and lack of maintenance but also to restructure and increment management and organization measures.

The main lesson is that reconstruction is a long-term process and certainly when it is combined with renewal and urban revitalization processes. Furthermore, it requires a multi-stakeholder approach but certainly with a guaranteed source of financing and political will. Thus, for Iraq cities it is fundamental to look at their internal capacity, organizational structure and policy instruments to undertake the reconstruction and upgrading operations. It goes without saying that – as shown in the diagram above – there is a need to design and pursue incremental development policies and flexible strategies required to adapt to new circumstances that will certainly appear in the future assuming that access to finance will not be a problem during the near future.

5.8   Conclusions

This chapter presented a brief review of the different policies pursued by Developing countries in order to deal with the problems of slums. It highlighted the international experience pinpointing its relevance to Iraq. It also brought forward lessons learned from 3 specific and different cases e.g. Rio de Janeiro's citywide slum upgrading programme (Brazil, 1994-to date), APUSP-Andhra Pradesh Urban Services for the Poor Project (India, 2000-to date) and the Rotterdam Post-war Inner City Reconstruction Programme (1945-to date). It is argued that these 3 arbitrarily selected cases provide important lessons for Iraq cities.

All three cases give evidences of the successes when the problem of slums is tackled from a programmatic approach meaning that there is a need to define a citywide or municipal policy through which the specific problems of slums can be addressed. Thus the problem of slums is only one dimension. The cases show the importance of defining a policy, strategy and institutional framework where responsibilities are clearly defined. Another aspect is that these cases indicate the multi-year character of the programmes. If Iraq cities are to tackle the problems of slums – within a framework of post-war reconstruction – they must design a programme that moves beyond the limitations of area-based pilot project interventions.

The other element highlighted by all cases is the access to financial resources. A secured source of finance can be regarded as a sine-qua-non condition to large-scale slum improvement programmes so that the risk of discontinuity is reduced and the chances of success and development impact are greatly increased.

The existence of a cadastre and baseline social, economic, physical and cartographic data was the starting point of all three cases and should be regarded as a fundamental prerequisite to design and execute a successful slum improvement programme. This was evident in Rio de Janeiro and Rotterdam and it certainly applies to Iraq. An urban slum observatory or any institutional and/or organisational mechanism – an implementing agency, a coordination unit, etc. must be put in place in order to collect, retrieve, analyse and monitor data and information on slums and urban decay in the cities. This feeds-in directly policy formulation and decision-making.

Regarding the operational aspects of these programmes, the three cases highlight the importance of coordination mechanisms. This was resolved through the appointment of an individual project manager and the restructuring of the institutional and organizational frameworks of the municipal government in order to cope efficiently with the demands of a large-scale urban programme. It is implicit that change of attitude, new procedures and modus operandi require capacity building of the various actors involved in the programme.

The case of Rotterdam highlights a very similar situation to Iraq that is to say the post-war reconstruction. It provides evidences that the process has a long-term character and there is a need to articulate renewal and urban revitalization policies geared to dilapidated neighbourhoods and slums with actual reconstruction of war-damaged neighbourhoods.

The participation of residents is fundamental. This was evident in the cases of Rotterdam and Andhra Pradesh. Both cases also highlights the importance of the economic dimension. Capacity building of residents but also the ability of upgrading activities to generate employment and income generation opportunities should be regarded as an important lesson to be considered for Iraq. This seems to address part of the poverty quest. Particularly when one considers the required reconstruction and upgrading of the existing war-damaged housing stock.